Physis (φύσις): nature, the natural order; of things, species, or kind: characteristic. Both Epictetus and Marcus repeatedly state that
we must use our ruling principle to keep ourselves in harmony with nature (Discourses 4.4.43; Marcus 3.9). In Stoic thought, God and nature
are one.
Pneuma (πνεῦμα): air, breath, spirit; a principle in Stoic physics. The part of the soul set into disturbance by desires and aversions,
which Haines calls the inferior part of the soul, distinct from nous (mind). Epictetus has a memorable image in Discourses 3.3.20–22, where
he talks about the movement of a disturbed bowl of water being like the spirit in which things exist.
Proêgmena (προηγμένα): preferred things; indifferent in an absolute moral sense, but of relative positive value, naturally
desirable things, such as health. Opposite of aproêgmena.
Prohairesis (προαίρεσις): reasoned or deliberative choice, our free will to choose, the sphere of choice. The term goes back to
Aristotle’s Ethics and has been traditionally translated there as “purposive choice.” A. A. Long, in an attempt to free it from modern moral
concepts, translates it as “volition,” a term we find too remote from everyday understanding—for generations prior it was translated as “moral
purpose” (W. A. Oldfather, George Long, and others). We are avoiding loading the term with either the moral sense of Christian tradition or
the modernist sense of will, so heavily colored since Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. A. A. Long sees this as Epictetus’s preferred term for
what distinguishes human beings from animals (which also have hêgemonikon in his reading of Epictetus; Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic
Guide to Life, p. 211), something not even the gods can touch (Discourses 1.1.23). The term is used sixty-nine times in the Discourses
(1.4.18–22, 1.18.21–23, 1.22.10, 1.29.1–4a, 2.1.12–13, 2.5.4–5, 2.6.25, 2.10.1, 2.16.1–2a, 2.22.19–20, 3.1.39b–40a, 3.3.18–19, 3.7.5, 3.10.18,
3.19.2–3, 3.21.1–3, 3.22.13, 4.4.23, 4.5.34–37) and six times in the Enchiridion (13). Marcus uses it five times in the negative (ἀπροαίρετα),
or outside of our choice, and three times in the positive sense of deliberate choice (3.6, 6.41, 8.56, 12.3, 12.33). Where this is the focal point of
Epictetus’s system, Marcus leans heavily to hêgemonikon.
Prokopê (προκοπή): progress or improvement; on the path toward the virtues of self-control, courage, justice, and wisdom. See
Epictetus, Discourses 1.4, captioned “on progress,” especially 1.4.18–22; also 3.19.2–3. The word appears fourteen times in Epictetus (most
often in 1.4). Hanging out with the wrong people can limit our progress, according to Epictetus (4.2.1–5), and Musonius Rufus reminds us of
the same (Lectures 11.53.21–22; losing our soul).
Prolêpsis (πρόληψις): a primary conception, or preconception, possessed by all rational beings. Epictetus talks about keeping them
ready like polished weapons (Discourses 4 –5a, 6b). See also 1.22 and 1.2.5–7, where he talks about working over our preconceptions and the
true meaning of education.
Pronoia (πρόνοια): foreknowledge, foresight, divine providence. Epictetus says we can praise providence if we have two qualities:
seeing things clearly and gratitude (1.6.1–2). Marcus talks about entrusting the future to providence in 12.1. The word appears ten times in
Epictetus (see 3.17.1) and twelve times in Marcus.
Prosochê (προσοχή): attention, diligence, soberness. See especially Discourses 4.12.1–21. In 1.20.8–11, Epictetus says it is particularly
needed for things that might steer us wrongly. Marcus uses the term once in the body of his Meditations in speaking about what a short time
we have in life to keep indifferent things from consuming our attention (11.16; not here).
Psychê (ψυχή): state of mind, soul, life, living principle. It appears forty-three times in the Discourses, and the laconic Marcus uses it
sixty-nine times in his Meditations. Marcus has a beautiful image of the rational soul as a sphere in 11.12 (not here); Epictetus sees it as a
bowl of water in 3.3.20–22. Seneca’s term is animus, the rational soul. The Stoics were materialists, so the soul itself has substance.
Sophos (σοφός): wise person, virtuous sage, and the ethical ideal of a practicing Stoic.
Sympatheia (συμπάθεια): sympathy, affinity of parts to the organic whole, mutual interdependence.
Synkatathesis (συγκατάθεσις): assent; approval to impressions, conceptions, and judgments, enabling action to take place. See
Marcus quoting Epictetus in 11.37 (in verb form) and how it relates to katalêpsis; also, in 5.10 Marcus talks about how every assent to
impressions is subject to error. This is the third level of self-coherence, concerning the will and judgment and what we choose to reject (see
chart). It appears eight times in noun form and twenty-one times in verb form in Epictetus: 3.2.1–3a, 3.8.4, and 4.11.6–7.
Technê (τέχνη): craft, art in the sense of profession or vocation. Marcus says our technê is to be a good human being (11.5). Epictetus
uses the analogies of crafts and trades quite often, particularly in drawing focus to the proper material of our work as human beings.
Telos (τέλος): the end goal or objective of life.
Theôrêma (θεώρημα): general principle or perception, a truth of science; used interchangeably with dogmata in discussing the
mind’s store of judgments.
Theos (θεός): god; the divine, creative power that orders the universe and gives human beings their reason and freedom of
choice. As far as theology goes, despite reflecting the polytheism of their culture and making references to gods of all stripes, the late Stoics
were monists and pantheists: God = nature. Further, they were materialists, so even the divine spark in us—and the soul—are corporeal.
Epictetus was a Phrygian by birth and had a very vivid, personalistic view of God. He referred to God as a kindly father (see particularly
Discourses 1.6, 3.24). A. A. Long, the foremost scholar of Epictetus, put it this way: “Whether [Epictetus] speaks of Zeus or God or Nature
or the gods, he is completely committed to the belief that the world is providentially organized by a divine power whose creative agency
reaches its highest manifestation in human beings” (Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, p. 134). Long thinks Epictetus was