says that every duty in life is a sum of acts that deserve methodical attention (6.26).
Koinos (κοινός): common, shared in common. As Haines noted, this term and its cognates appear more than eighty times in Marcus, and it
is a very central part of his thinking and ethical orientation. Community, partnership, fellowship, neighborliness, and cooperation are all heavily
emphasized in terms ranging from κοινωνία (5.16, and “action for the common good in the present moment” in 9.6) to his own coined word
κοινονοημοσύνη, regard for the feelings of others (1.16). In 6.30, Marcus tells us, “Life is short—the fruit of this life is a good character and
acts for the common good.” See also his morning ritual to remind ourselves that we’ve “been made by nature for the purpose of working with
others” (8.12). A related common term appearing in both Marcus and Epictetus is the word ἀλλήλων/allêlôn, which stresses how we are
made “for each other” or “for one another” (twenty-six times in Marcus, especially 5.16 and 6.38; and twenty times in Epictetus, notably
2.20).
Kosmos (κόσμος): all-encompassing order, world, universe.
Logos/Logikos (λόγος/λογικός): reason or rational; the ordering principle of the cosmos. Logos spermatikos (λόγος σπερματικός) is
the generative principle of the universe, which creates and takes back all things (see Marcus 6.24).
Nomos (νόμος): law, custom.
Oiêsis (οἴησις): conceit, self-deception, illusion, arrogant opinion or notion. Epictetus says (3.14.8) that two things must be rooted out
of every human being: self-deception and mistrust/timidity (apistia). Our conceit, arrogance, and false opinions are what must be removed
(2.17.1), along with passion (pathos). Epictetus sees a movement from preconception (prolêpsis) through conception (hypolêpsis) to our
more firmly formed convictions (katalêpsis), and all can be subject to error (hamartia). Heraclitus called self-deception “an awful disease”
(Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 9.7), and the Stoics offered their practices for overcoming it.
Oikeiôsis (οἰκείωσις): self-ownership, appropriation to the individual’s or species’ needs. There is only one instance of this noun in
Epictetus (Discourses 1.19.15), which pertains to self-preservation, although it appears in a discussion of “the common interest.” Marcus also
has one use, and it moves explicitly to the other pole of appropriation—namely, to that which lends to the “care for others” or human fellowship
(3.9), and our ruling reason is what enables us to keep in accord with nature and effect such appropriation. The related verbal and adjectival
forms of “appropriating” and being “fitting or appropriate” are more common to both.
Orexis (ὄρεξις): desire, inclination toward a thing. The opposite of ekklisis. In Aristotle this was understood as “appetence” and was
something shared with animals and different from purposive choice (prohairesis), which involved both reason and deliberation. Epictetus says
if we want to be free, we shouldn’t desire something in someone else’s control (Discourses 1.4.18–22). Orexis/ekklisis are the subject of the
first of the three topoi, or areas of training that produce self-coherence, the other two being hormê/aphormê and synkatathesis (3.2.1–3a).
The word appears fifty-six times in the Discourses and seven times in the Enchiridion. It appears five times in Marcus, once in saying
principles need to be the source of desire and action (8.1.5) and be limited to only what’s in our control (8.7). The verb form, ὀρέγω/oregô,
meaning to reach out for, yearn for, often appears and in many instances it occurs with “not missing the mark”; see hamartanô and
apotynchanô.
Ousia (οὐσία): substance or being, sometimes used interchangeably with hulê (matter, material). Marcus speaks vividly of substance
being “like a river’s unending flow, its activities constantly changing and causes infinitely shifting so that almost nothing at all stands still”
(5.23), harkening back to Heraclitus (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, 9.8).
Paideia (παιδεία): training, teaching, and education. Askeô, manthanô, and meletaô (see chart) are each a part of getting an education
as outlined by Epictetus in Discourses 2.9.13–14. The daily disciplines are central to being educated for the Stoic, and only the educated are
truly free (2.1.21–23 and 1.22.9–10a). Working over our preconceptions (prolêpsin) is the point of education (1.2.5–7).
Pathos (πάθος): passion or emotion, often excessive and based on false judgments. Haines places passion as the “affect” following
from hormê that lead to acts against nature. The four passions divide into two types: ( 1 ) for things not in present possession or anticipated in
the future, which are desire (ἐπιθυμία) and fear (φόβος); and (2) for things presently engaging a person, which are pleasure (ἡδονή) and
distress (λύπη). Epictetus states the Stoic position most clearly in Discourses 4.1.175: “Freedom isn’t secured by filling up on your heart’s
desire but by removing your desire.” Diogenes Laertius says that Zeno defined passion/emotion as an irrational and unnatural movement in the
soul, or as excessive hormê (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 7.110). Despite the popular misconception, the Stoics did celebrate certain
passions as good (eupatheia), if in rational bounds: in particular, joy, caution, and wishing (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 7.116).
Phantasia (φαντασία): impression, appearance, perception. Epictetus says (1.1.7–9) that the gods gave us one power that governs all
the rest—“the ability to make the right use of appearances.” He also says that the first and greatest task of the philosopher is to test
(δοκιμάζω, “to assay”) and separate appearances (see also 2.18.24). He uses the metaphors of sweeping currents, battle, and the rigorous
training of an athlete for the work we must do to hold our own against impressions (2.18.27–28). “The task of the good and excellent person is
to handle their impressions in harmony with nature” (3.3.1). There are more than two hundred references to phantasia in the Discourses and
nine in the Enchiridion ( 34 ). The term appears about forty times in Marcus’s Meditations (5.2, 5.16, 6.13, 8.7, 8.26, 8.28–29). Marcus has a
great exercise for not telling yourself more than initial impressions (“report” in 8.49).
Phronêsis (φρόνησις): practical wisdom, one of the four cardinal virtues. The term is used repeatedly by Marcus, most memorably in
4.37, where he says that “wisdom and acting justly are one and the same,” and in 5.9, where he says “there is nothing so pleasing as wisdom
itself.” See arête.