Gray’s second major worry regarding the relationship between liberalism
and pluralism concerns the singularity of liberalism itself. His key critique of
both Berlin’s and Raz’s attempts to reconcile liberalism and pluralism is that
the liberal way of life has no special or universal claim in a pluralist universe.
‘‘[I]f value pluralism is true, the range of forms of genuine humanXourishing
is considerably larger than can be accommodated within liberal forms of life.
As a matter of logic alone, it is safe to say that value pluralism cannot
mandate liberalism, where that is taken to be a theory or set of principles
claiming universal authority’’ (Gray 1995 , 133 ). Gray ( 1995 , 126 ) argues that we
need to reject the idea that liberalism can be the singular response to a plural
world, the single regime ideally best for all humankind, applicable to all
cultures; he insists that there may be other, non-liberal ways of adopting
plurality that exist in other cultures and ways of life. We should look for those
Wrst, in context, in arguing for pluralistic systems outside of the historically
liberal societies of the USA and Europe. 5
For other pluralists, liberalism is pluralistically redeemable with more
attention to the diVerences and particularities of social and cultural groups.
These theorists examine the potential of expanding liberalism in pluralist
directions, or of resolving the various critiques or limitations of liberalism
with a thorough dose of pluralistic understanding. The point is not to reject
liberalism or limit plurality, but to focus on particular potential-laden aspects
of liberalism—respect, consent, democratic participation—that can serve a
pluralistic society. Deveaux ( 2000 ), for example, argues that liberalism can be
expanded to encompass a broadly deWned, group-based, cultural pluralism
with three broad conceptual shifts. First, liberalism’s understanding of diver-
sity would be reconceived, from an individualist to a social and collective
conception (Deveaux 2000 , 32 ). Second, although clearly related, liberalism
must move from accepting solely moral or value pluralism to an understand-
ing of cultural pluralism. Individual moral and value diVerences simply do
not cover all of the crucial features of social and cultural diversity in con-
temporary states. Third, Deveaux argues for a more thorough recognition of
5 Gray criticizes the liberal universalist dream of overthrowing regimes and replacing them with a
Western liberalism, when in fact more could be done to preserve plurality by exploring historical,
traditional, and/or cultural processes that would more seamlessly be implemented from within. But
there are two weaknesses in Gray’s anti-liberal argument. First, he does not discuss societies that are
not only illiberal, but anti-pluralist; plenty of non-liberal systems are far from the pluralist ideal.
Second, Gray’s focus on whole societies oVers no speciWc help for dealing with the growing cultural
pluralism in already-deWned liberal societies.
156 david schlosberg