liberal society with diVerent illiberal cultures, but also, by the same token,
shows its inadequacy to deal politically with contemporary pluralism.
Recent developments in perfectionist thinking have, however, pointed out
adiVerent attitude towards social cultural diVerences that suggests a distinct-
ive liberal perspective on multicultural issues. Yet the opening up to other
cultures does not imply a revision of the conception of toleration which is
supposed to represent only an early stage of liberal politics, deWnitely incap-
able of dealing with issues of cultural diversity. The perfectionist position,
pro-multiculturalism, is best represented by Joseph Raz ( 1994 a), and it is
shared by an increasing number of scholars, sometimes called the new-
autonomists (Kymlikca 1992 , 1995 a, 1995 b; Raz 1994 b; Margalit and Halbertal
1994 ; Margalit and Raz 1995 ). They assign a special role to culture for
autonomous choices and individual well-being which leads to the right to
culture and imposes on the state the duty to support cultures. In this way,
new-autonomists endorse cultural rights and multicultural policies. But, as
I said, their conception of toleration is unchanged, since they regard toler-
ation as a politics of state abstinence from religious and moral questions,
hence utterly unWt to grasp identity issues.
By comparison, political or neutralist liberalism looks more open toward
diVerences, and really inclusive of anyone’s identity under the common
principles of justice. From the neutralist point of view, the nature of toler-
ation is less the suppression of the power of interference with disliked
diVerences than the adoption of a neutral attitudes vis-a`-vis conXictual social
diVerences, which have been recognized as irrelevant for political life. There-
fore, while in the perfectionist perspective, for toleration to be the case,
dislike or disapproval of the diVerence in question are necessary conditions,
in the neutralist interpretation, moral disapproval, even if it may be at the
origin of the conXict among certain social diVerences, is deWnitely a circum-
stance to be politically disregarded. In fact, the reasons for toleration are
independent from the content of the diVerence, deriving instead from a
general position against repression and coercion in certain matters. There-
fore, the only relevant circumstance for political toleration isconXictamong
social diVerences; conXict which, moreover, isnon-negotiable, andnot easily
adjudicableby universally recognized procedures. Furthermore, if the gener-
alization of the model of political toleration implies the principle of public
neutrality, then any public moral judgment over diVerences is excluded as a
matter of principle. In this framework toleration follows from the principles
of justice and, at the same time, is the condition of their possibility. Its
identity, difference, toleration 569