diVerent trait, practice, or identity in the range of the legitimate, viable,
‘‘normal’’ options of an open society. In this respect the public recognition
of diVerences, being independent of their content, is in fact compatible with
public neutrality, although under a revised interpretation. 1 It neither means
the equal banning of all diVerences and particularities from the public sphere,
as implied in thelaı ̈cite ́ideal, nor the disregard of all diVerences in public
action, as implied in the notion of public blindness. If diVerences have been
markers of invisibility and exclusion, then, as compensation, a positive public
attention and consideration is precisely in line with what neutrality stands
for. A revised neutrality which makes room for public recognition of iden-
tities should not aim at theWnal cancellation of all diVerences, as a result of
compensating the disadvantages attached to them; but to make all citizens
positively at ease with their full-blown identities in public as well as in private.
If public recognition can be reconciled with a revised notion of neutrality, it
can also be reconciled with impartiality. Although recognition works only if
granted to single identities, this does not mean singling out and favoring any
group in particular, hence giving up the principle of universal justice. Sym-
bolic recognition is not exclusive, that is, it is not a scarce commodity, posing
problems of distribution. Provided that the diVerence in question does not
infringe any right, public recognition, although it must be granted to each
diVerence separately, can be generalized to all claimants.
Toleration as recognition thus acknowledges diVerent identities as its
proper subjects and points out that cultural contrasts are invariably fueled
and inXamed by asymmetries in social standing, status, respect of diVerent
groups struggling to improve their status, or alternatively, resisting any such
change. Focusing on the power relationship between groups, however, does
not automatically solve the cases of incompatibility sometimes arising be-
tween certain cultural practice and legal norms or individual rights. The hotly
debated issue of headscarves at state schools in France; practices concerning
arranged marriages; various demands of exemption of state mandatory
education for children; up to perhaps the most controversial issue, female
genital mutilation, are all instances of incompatibility, questioning the limits
1 The revised notion of neutrality I am advocating is very close to the notion of ‘‘evenhandedness’’
put forward by Joseph Carens ( 2000 ). Carens prefers the label evenhandedness instead of neutrality in
order to stress the diVerent attitude with more usual notions of neutrality. While I can see his point,
I think it important to retain neutrality because of the implication of content-independence which
I entrust to my conception of a recognition of diVerences.
identity, difference, toleration 575