whenever the visibility of some groups’ practice in public space is perceived as
loud and provocative and hence as an invasion of particular identities into the
political domain and a plea for special consideration infringing neutrality. In
these cases, I defend toleration of diVerences in the public sphere, not on the
grounds of an argument showing the compatibility between the diVerences
and neutrality, but on the grounds of justice. Indeed, public exclusion of
diVerences isWrst unfair, because it treats members of minorities diVerently
from members of the majority, whose identity is openly visible everywhere in
the political domain. Secondly, it is unjust because the invisibility of diVer-
ences concurs to keep minorities in a marginal position of second-class
citizenship. Toleration can meet these questions of justice concerning minor-
ities’ unequal social standing if it is conceived of as public recognition of
excluded, marginalized, and oppressed identities (Galeotti 2002 ).
Yet, if the argument for toleration as recognition has been shown to be
grounded on principles of liberal justice, namely non-discrimination, equal-
ity of respect, inclusion, some may object that it nevertheless implies a
conXict with liberal principles, that is with neutrality, universality, and
impartiality. Recognition in fact seems to imply that diVerences should be
considered in their content in order to be valued; and in doing so, the state
and its oYcials have to refer to some ideal of the good as the criterion. In this
way, the liberal state would give up its neutralist stance. Moreover, public
recognition of diVerences cannot be granted universally, but always speciW-
cally, and only for the diVerences which have passed the test for recognition.
Thus, impartiality too would be sacriWced in the name of identity politics.
I hold that this objection is, however, dependent on a questionable concep-
tion of recognition. Recognition is interpreted here as acknowledging, or even
endorsing, the intrinsic value of the diVerence in question (Taylor 1993 ). In
this strong interpretation, recognition deWnitely cannot apply to democratic
institutions. But public recognition of diVerences admits of another less
problematic meaning (Galeotti 2002 ; Fraser 2003 ).
DiVerences can be recognized not for their intrinsic value, which is not up
to the political authorities to appreciate, but instrumentally, for the value
they have for their bearers. To be more precise, diVerences can be acknow-
ledged to have the same value for their bearers as that which the ‘‘normal’’
characteristics and practices have for the majority. In other words, the public
recognition of diVerences has nothing to do with the public appreciation of a
diVerence and of its value, not to say its public endorsement. Here, this
notion more modestly means the acceptance, and hence the inclusion of a
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