which are oppressive, particularly to the extent that group practice goes
against the norms of the host society, which will have its own, ‘‘thick,’’ shared
understandings of what is right and wrong (Walzer 1997 b). For Charles
Taylor, the oVer of toleration, particularly in liberal societies, has generally
been of little value, for it has failed to appreciate what groups really want, and
has all too often turned out to deliver even less than promised.
Taylor’s writings pose a challenge to liberal solutions to the problem of
dealing with diVerence because he insists that all such solutions have failed to
appreciate the nature of the demands made by particular groups. Under-
standing that groups have wanted recognition of some kind, liberal regimes
have responded by oVering them equality: equal rights, equal status, even a
measure of material equality and, ultimately, equal dignity. ‘‘With the politics
of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an
identical basket of rights and immunities’’ (Taylor 1994 , 38 ). The problem,
however, is that what groups desired was recognition of their dignity not as
members of a universal community but as individuals and groups distinct
from everyone else. For these groups, non-discrimination and toleration are
not enough; and the idea that the liberal state might be seen as a neutral
framework in which they, along with all others, mightXourish under diVer-
ence-blind principles was simply an illusion. The reality is that liberalism is
not the meeting ground for all cultures but ‘‘the political expression of one
range of cultures, and quite incompatible with other ranges’’ (Taylor 1994 ,
62 ). For Taylor, Kymlicka’s group-diVerentiated rights solution is too weak,
for it does not go far enough to recognize how much groups matter to their
members. Granting diVerent groups rights to enable them to pursue particu-
lar cultural goods works only ‘‘for existing people who Wnd themselves
trapped within a culture under pressure, and canXourish within it or not
at all. But it does not justify measures designed to ensure survival through
indeWnite future generations’’ (Taylor 1994 , 62 ).
The charge that liberalism fails to accord groups the right measure of
recognition is also pressed by Iris Young, for whom assimilation lies at the
heart of the liberal impulse. The ‘‘politics of diVerence’’ she advocates is a
politics of group assertion (Young 1990 , 167 ) that looks to extend the scope of
democracy to include the marginalized and oppressed within the political
process. It is exclusion that does most to reinforce oppression. The problem
with liberal humanism is that, for all its universalist pretensions, it simply
perpetuates existing patterns of dominance, albeit in the name of individual
liberty and justice as impartiality.
590 chandran kukathas