civilian and military institutions, which in Latin America ‘contributes to
military perceptions that they are better organized, better trained, more
cohesive and more patriotic than civilian political leaders’ has to be cor-
rected (Fitch, 1998, p. 159). The right incentives to induce the military to
accept subordination to civilian leadership have to be chosen. Military
attitudes have to be reoriented away from a guardian role and towards loy-
alty to civilian political leaders. Any duplication of roles between the mili-
tary and civilian politicians must be minimized, for example by ending the
military’s role in internal security. The military leadership must be restricted
to an advisory role in defence policy. Equally, political leaders have to agree
not to draw the armed forces into conflict resolution and recognize that
military leaders have a legitimate role in defence policy-making (Frazer,
1995; Huntington, 1995, pp. 9–10; Fitch, 1998; Bland, 1999).
Thirdly, keeping the military under civilian control requires extensive
public support for democracy and hostility to military rule, perhaps fueled
by recollections of past authoritarianism, as in Venezuela in 1992 (Baburkin
et al., 1999). Regional alliances supporting civilian political supremacy
may help, as in southern Africa in 1994 when South Africa, Botswana and
Zimbabwe helped reverse the coupin Lesotho (Frazer, 1995).
The timing of reforms to civil–military relations is also important.
Movement towards reform should start in the transition to democracy when
negotiations are being conducted between officials and political leaders
who are committed to change. This will go some way towards guarding
against the new regime acquiring an inheritance of disloyal and disaffected
military personnel (Frazer, 1995).
The extent to which these conditions are achievable is affected by a num-
ber of factors. Past patterns of civil–military relations (e.g. the extent to
which the armed forces have been politicized or a lively civil society allowed
to exist), and threats posed by democratization to the sectional interests of
the military (e.g. the scale of cuts to the military budget proposed by the new
civilian government) will be important. Popular support for democracy may
be fragile and need political parties not to have created a disillusioned popu-
lace. There may need to be ‘ethnic balance’ in the social composition of the
armed forces. The effect of military reorganization during democratization
on the policy goals of the new government, such as whether the military is
assisting in the control of drug trafficking, may also be important for the
establishment of democratic civil–military relations (Griffiths, 1996). The
new civilian regime may have to compromise on demands for military lead-
ers to be brought to justice for their crimes (Rouquie, 1986, pp. 131–2). The
military will continue to have much political influence, especially if during
Military Intervention in Politics 191