The Elegant Magister 139these years. Kant probably completed it by June 1763, and it was published
in the same year. In it, Kant opposed using the mathematical method in
philosophy, while at the same time arguing that mathematics may be use¬
fully employed in philosophy. He differentiated between logical opposition,
or contradiction, and real opposition, or a conflict of forces. Nothing that
contains a logical contradiction can exist. Accordingly, whatever is con¬
tradictory in the logical sense is nothing. However, an object that involves
real opposition is possible. Impenetrability is an example of this. It is "neg¬
ative attraction," or a force by means of which a body hinders another body
from occupying the place it occupies. Kant also adduces other examples
taken from psychology and morality to show that it makes sense to speak
of negative magnitudes. There are many objects that contain forces that are
opposed to each other, even though, because they cancel each other out,
nothing seems to be happening. Yet only a spark may be required to set
something in motion that is based on these opposing forces.
All of this seems to be quite compatible with his earlier system, ac¬
cording to which an external influence may awaken an internal change. In¬
deed, it may be seen as a further explication of that view. The explication
of real reasons (Realgründe) seems to be based again on Baumgarten, and
the estimation of the function of living forces seems to be the same as be¬
fore.^188 Real reasons are internal, not external. There is something "great
and ... important" in Leibniz's claim that "the soul with its power of rep¬
resentation comprises the entire universe."^189 Still, Kant's distinction be¬
tween real and ideal reasons is meant to be different from that of Crusius
and Wolff. Real reasons are those reasons that do not simply follow the law
of contradiction. They are not known by judgments but by concepts. These
concepts may be analyzed into "simple and un-analyzable concepts, whose
relation to what follows cannot be made distinct."^190 This represents the
limit of the knowledge of all causality.
Kant poses clearly for the first time the question of the validity of the
causal relation: "How am I to understand that something exists because some¬
thing else exists."m The relation cannot be logical or merely epistemological
(like Crusius's ideal reason). There must be a real reason, but the question
is what it is. Perhaps we will never know. Only analysis will tell. Kant prom¬
ises such an analysis. He will not be content with such words as "cause,"
"effect," force," and "action." He will try to see whether he can "by analy¬
sis reach more simple concepts of real reasons so that ultimately all our cog¬
nitions of these relations end in concepts of simple and unanalysable real
reasons."^192
This is a view with which a Leibnizian could live quite well. In any case,