402 Kant: A Biography
There is much that is interesting in the first part of the "Elements of
Ethics"; but it is interesting mainly because it complements his earlier dis¬
cussions of ethical principles, not because it adds anything new. Therefore
it is perhaps not necessary to summarize it here. Though many of the "Ca¬
suistical Questions" Kant adds to the discussion of particular duties are
interesting and show that he had a better insight into the complexities
of moral life than many have given him credit for. The complete system of
duties that Kant finally presents to us is a doctrine of virtue; what he ul¬
timately aims at is a virtue-based ethics, one in which character plays a
central role, and not some kind of constructivist moral system. The cate¬
gorical imperative is intimately bound up with virtue:
Virtue is the strength of a human being's maxims in fulfilling his duty. Strength of any
kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in this case the
obstacles are natural inclinations... and since it is man himself who puts these ob¬
stacles in the way of his maxims, virtue is not merely a self-constraint... but also a
self-constraint in accordance with a principle of inner freedom, and so through the
mere representation of one's duty in accordance with its formal law.^71
Indeed, the "basic principle of the doctrine of virtue" is the categorical
imperative.
The Conclusion, entitled "Religion as the Doctrine of Duties to God Lies
Beyond the Bounds of Pure Moral Philosophy," is of great biographical
interest. For, though Kant had'promised some years before that he would
not treat religion in his writings, at least as long as he was His Majesty's sub¬
ject, here he comes close to doing just that. In any case, not only does he
take up the problem of the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason, he even
refers to the work. He argues that while we can explain religion as "the sum
of all duties as ... divine commands," this does not make "a duty of reli¬
gion into a duty to God."^72 Religion has no say in morals. For in
ethics, as pure practical moral philosophy of internal lawgiving, only the moral rela¬
tions of men to men are conceivable by us. The question of what sort of moral relation
holds between God and man ... is entirely inconceivable for us ... ethics cannot ex¬
tend beyond the limits of men's duties to one another.^73
These last few sentences of the Doctrine of Virtu go toward proving that
those who accuse Kant of being a coward in his dispute with Frederick Wil¬
liam II and the censors are wrong.
Kant's essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Love of Human¬
ity," which also appeared in 1797, was an answer to Benjamin Constant,
who had criticized Kant in an article that had appeared earlier in that year.