The Old Man 401means, among other things, that settlement by Europeans of newly dis¬
covered lands "may not take place by force but only by contract."^69
The Doctrine of Virtue is divided into two main parts, a long part on the
elements of ethics and a short part on the methods of virtue. The second
part deals with the teaching of ethics and something Kant calls "ethical
ascetics." He believes that ethics should be taught neither dogmatically
(where only the teacher speaks) nor by dialogue (where both question and
answer each other), but by catechism (where the teacher asks and the stu¬
dent answers, being helped by the teacher if he does not know the answer).
This is to be a moral catechism, not a religious one. Indeed, Kant insists
that instruction in moral duties must precede instruction in religious
doctrines. Kant's idea of ethical ascetics goes back to ancient exercises in
virtue. Like the Stoics and the Epicureans, Kant feels that virtues must be
practiced to take hold. Punishment has no place in moral instruction for
Kant. Ultimately, we must train ourselves to be moral.
Kant's "Elements of Ethics" follows the familiar division between duties
to oneself and duties to others. Some of these virtues are perfect, that is,
they prescribe precisely what we must do; others are imperfect, that is, it
is left up to us how much we should do. An example of an imperfect duty to
ourselves is the duty to better ourselves, or the duty of self-improvement.
We should all work on improving ourselves, but it is far from clear how far
we should go. Curiously enough, this duty of self-improvement comes for
Kant in two flavors, namely, a duty to improve our "natural" perfection
and a duty to improve our moral perfection. We should try to do things from
the right motives, or strive for "holiness," and we should do all our duties,
that is, we should strive for perfection. Kant assures us that these can be
only imperfect duties:
The depths of the human heart are unfathomable. Who knows himself well enough to
say when he feels the incentive to fulfill his duty, whether he proceeds entirely from the
representation of the law or whether there are not many other sensible impulses con¬
tributing to it that look to one's advantage.. .and that, in other circumstance, could just
as well serve vice?... (objectively) there is only one virtue (as moral strength of one's
maxims); but in fact (subjectively) there is a multitude of virtues... our self-knowledge
can never adequately tell us whether it is complete [in being virtuous] or deficient...^70the duty of moral self-improvement is imperfect, it is far from clear
°r Kant how hard we should strive to be morally perfect. This is some-
•ng that those who accuse Kant of pursuing moral sainthood would do
We" to remember.