subjects. Whatever you might think about the long-term future of folk
psychology, at the present time there is really no other alternative.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have made a start on investigating the relationships
between folk psychology and scientiWc psychology. We have argued that
folk psychology isrealistin its commitments to inner organisation and the
causal role of mental states. This opens up the possibility of elimination.
But we have also argued that the prospects for a relatively smooth incor-
poration of folk-psychological categories into science are good – on this
matter, it may well turn out that the folk have got things more-or-less
right.
selected reading
On the intentional stance see especially: Dennett, 1981, 1987, 1988a.
For Fodor’s combination of nomological autonomy for special sciences and real-
ism about folk psychology you might want to consult: Fodor, 1974, 1987. For
further arguments for realism about folk psychology see: Davies, 1991.
Arguments for eliminativism are presented in: Churchland, 1979, ch.4, 1981;
Ramseyet al., 1990.
One of theWrst of many rebuttals of Churchland’s version of eliminativism is:
Horgan and Woodward, 1985.
Wilkes presents her case for the lack of connection between folk and scientiWc
psychology in: Wilkes, 1978, 1991a, 1991b.
48 Folk-psychological commitments