P: PHU/IrP
c CUNYB/Clarke December, :
The Principles of Philosophy()
qualities of bodies, to be as incomprehensible: and therefore could not with reason
presse him, to show how a body was able to doe such an operation, as I should inferre
must of necessity proceede from a spirit, since that neyther could I give account how
the loadestone drew iron, or looked to the north, how a stone, and other heavy thinges
were carried downewardes: how sight or fantasie was made; how digestion or purging
were effected; and many other such questions, which are so slightly resolved in the
schooles.
The obvious danger in this approach to explanation is spelled out in
the Preface to the second treatise (on the soul). Scholastic philosophers,
according to Digby, had turned ‘all bodies into spirits, making (for exam-
ple) heate, or cold, to be of it selfe indivisible, a thing by it selfe, whose
nature is not conceivable’.Having thus collapsed the fundamental dis-
tinction between matter and spirit by using ‘spiritual’ explanations of
merely material phenomena, they risked supporting those who argue from
the same mistake to the opposite conclusion. If purely material things are
mistakenly given a spiritual explanation, then those features of human
experience, such as thought, that require a similar spiritual explanation
are likely to be no more than complex material processes that are not
currently understood.
Digby, in opposition to scholastic philosophy, was anxious to show that
‘our Soule is a substance, and Immortall’.Although in natural philos-
ophy we should rely on the evidence of our senses and avoid postulat-
ing unnecessary forms or substances, the opposite applies here. ‘We are
now out of the boundes that experience hath any iurisdiction over:...we
must in all our searches and conclusions rely only upon the single evi-
dence of Reason.’One of the arguments he used was borrowed from
‘Monsieur des Cartes in his Methode’.This was the argument that
the mind by definition does not have the properties that are characteris-
tic of material things. By appealing to an experience that was relatively
familiar to soldiers at the time, Digby reminds readers that even if one
is missing a leg or an arm, one is still a ‘thinking thing’.Descartes and
Digby both knew that a similar argument does not work in the case of
the brain; without a brain, one ceases to think. Their argument showed
only that arms or legs are not necessary for thinking, while a brain is obvi-
ously necessary. However, they supported their position by arguing that
it makes no sense to think of half a mind, whereas it always makes sense
to think of half a body. The fragility of the argument was beginning to
be exposed.