had no bearing on the case because the grand jury had
subsequently returned a two-count indictment charging
assault with intent to rape and rape.
Cross-examination on credibility can be very far-
ranging. In State v. Wormley, 305 N.J. Super. 57 (App.
Div. 1997), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 607 (1998), the
Appellate Division reversed robbery and weapons
convictions because the trial court precluded cross-
examination regarding the victim’s long-standing drug
usage, despite his denial that he had used drugs at the
time he was robbed.
Conversely, in response to cross-examination of a
witness regarding his use of drugs or alcohol on a
particular occasion, thus attacking the witness’
credibility, the proponent of the witness may support his
credibility by eliciting opinion or reputation testimony
that the witness did not drink or use drugs to rebut the
inference that the witness’ perception was impaired.
State v. Johnson, 216 N.J. Super. 588 (App. Div. 1987).
In State v. Farr, 183 N.J. Super. 463, 468-69 (App.
Div. 1982), the prosecutor cross-examined the
defendant charged with armed robbery as to his
employment status and financial obligations and
commented upon them in his summation. The
Appellate Division held that the cross-examination and
comment were proper in that they were in direct response
to defendant’s testimony that he was employed and
therefore had no motive to rob.
Similarly, in State v. Plowden, 126 N.J. Super. 228,
230-231 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 64 N.J. 504 (1974),
the court ruled that it is not improper cross-examination
to interrogate a witness as to conduct on his part at
variance and inconsistent with what would be natural or
probable if his statement on his direct examination were
true. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by
showing that he failed to speak or act when it would have
been natural to do so if the facts were in accordance with
his testimony. Thus, it was not improper for the
prosecutor to cross-examine an alibi witness as to why she
had not come forward with exculpatory evidence prior to
trial. In addition, the prosecutor was well within his
rights in commenting on the witness’ failure to go to the
police during his summation. But see, State v. Felton, 131
N.J. Super. 344, 353-354 (App. Div. 1974), in which the
Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a new trial
when, subsequent to the defendant connecting, during
his trial testimony, his own innocence to the innocence
of a codefendant separately tried, the State impermissibly
suggested to the jury during cross-examination that the
codefendant has been found guilty.In State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396 (1987), the
prosecution attacked the defendant’s credibility by
questioning his knowledge of his codefendant’s prior
criminal acts. Defendant, being tried separately on the
charge of armed robbery, claimed that he had “minimal
contact” with his codefendant prior to the date of the
offense. Yet, during lengthy cross-examination on the
topic, defendant admitted knowledge of a prior robbery
in which his codefendant was involved. The Court, in
remanding the case on another matter, directed that the
trial judge permit a “reasonable exploration” of
defendant’s knowledge of his codefendant’s prior
criminal conduct at retrial, so long as the questioning was
directed at defendant’s credibility regarding his prior
familiarity with the codefendant, and was not a back-
door attempt at establishing the bad character of the
codefendant.Other than limitations on prior consistent
statements (see also HEARSAY, PRIOR CONSISTENT
STATEMENTS, infra), and those governing character
evidence in N.J.R.E. 607, there are few limitations on the
circumstances in which the credibility of a witness can be
supported, either through direct or redirect examination
or extrinsic evidence. State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 613-
14 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 321 (1992).
However, an expert witness may not express an opinion
as to the credibility of a statement by another witness.
State v. J.Q., 252 N.J. Super. 11, 39 (App. Div. 1991),
aff’d, 130 N.J. 554 (1993).Bias is a special subcategory of credibility. However,
the trial court does not enjoy the same broad discretion
to exclude evidence relating to bias as it does with regard
to evidence merely affecting credibility in general. Bias
describes the relationship between a party and a witness
which might lead the party to slant, unconsciously or
otherwise, his testimony in favor or against a party. State
v. Holmes, 290 N.J. Super. 302, 312-13 (App. Div.
1996). Proof of bias is almost always relevant. Id.In State v. Furey, 128 N.J. Super. 12, 23-24 (App.
Div. 1974), the court ruled that defense counsel should
be afforded wide latitude in his cross-examination of a
State’s witness in order to establish bias. Specifically, the
defense may question a prosecution witness concerning a
completely unrelated indictment which is pending