admission in a criminal trial is subject to the rules
established in State v. Spann, 130 N.J. 484 (1993).
Isoenzyme tests analyze blood for six enzyme
systems. The procedure then compares the results to the
general population, which arrives at a figure which
represents the percentage of the population which has a
particular enzyme. Such testing was held in State v. King,
215 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 1987), to be sufficiently
reliable to be admitted into evidence.
DNA testing has also been found sufficiently
reliable. State v. Harvey, 157 N.J. 117 (1997) (PCR);
State v. Marcus, 294 N.J. Super. 267, 279-80 (App. Div.
1996), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 543 (1998).
Judicial disfavor with the results of so-called “truth
serums” was reaffirmed in State v. Blome, 209 N.J. Super.
227 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 458
(1986). The prosecution, in summation, argued that the
defendant could have confirmed her claim of insanity by
submitting to sodium amytal while hospitalized shortly
after the homicide with which she was charged. The
reviewing court held that these comments constituted
reversible error. The decision was based not so much on
Fifth Amendment grounds as on the lack of reliable
evidence showing that “truth serums” produce truthful
responses in its users. Statements procured during the
use of sodium amytal would be inadmissible at trial
because of the as-yet unproven reliability of the drug.
Comparison between a shoe print and a shoe does not
require expert testimony. State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263,
293-94 (1990). With respect to expert testimony in
other areas involving the size and shape of feet, the
reliability of the scientific techniques utilized is open to
question. See State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407, 428-29
(1990); State v. Prudden, 212 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div.
1986).
The results of a search conducted with the use of a
metal detector were held to have been erroneously
admitted at trial, at least where the trial court failed to
take expert testimony regarding the reliability and
accuracy of the device, and no evidence was offered to
show that the device was operating properly on the day
of the search. State v. Burks, 208 N.J. Super. 595 (App.
Div. 1986). A police officer was improperly permitted to
state that, had the homicide victim fired his gun at the
defendant as the defendant said he had, the metal
detector would have uncovered spent shells from the
victim’s gun.
The courts have held that the battered woman’s
syndrome has a sufficient scientific basis to produce
uniform and reasonably reliable results so as to permit its
introduction in a prosecution for murder which resulted
in a conviction of reckless manslaughter. State v. Kelly, 97
N.J. 178 (1984).The courts have permitted expert testimony with
regard to human tracking by a bloodhound, provided a
proper foundation is laid regarding the handler of the dog
as an expert and the dog in question as being trained and
reliable in the tracking of human beings. State v. Parton,
251 N.J. Super. 230, 233-35 (App. Div. 1991), certif.
denied, 127 N.J. 560 (1992); State v. Wanczyk, 196 N.J.
Super. 397 (Law Div. 1984), rev’d o.g., 201 N.J. Super.
258 (App. Div. 1985).Although the courts are liberal regarding the
admission of expert testimony where it will assist the jury,
they will not permit its introduction where it will cause
confusion. In State v. Conway, 193 N.J. Super. 133, 169
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 97 N.J. 650 (1984), the court
held that expert testimony regarding discourse analysis,
which is a discipline used to determine the intent of the
speaker in covertly recorded conversations, was
inadmissible. The court held that discourse analysis had
not gained general acceptance in the field of linguistics
and was a potential source of confusion for the jury,
thereby justifying its exclusion.XXX. SUFFICIENCY OF PROOFS AND
RECORD
R.. 3:18-1 provides for the entry of a judgment of
acquittal by the trial court at the end of the State’s case
or at the close of the evidence if the evidence is insufficient
to warrant a conviction on one or more counts of an
indictment. R.. 3:18-2 provides for a motion for an
acquittal to be made within ten days of a guilty verdict.The oft-stated standard, derived from State v. Reyes,
50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967), is that t h e
question the trial judge must determine is whether,
viewing the State’s evidence in its entirety, be that
evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the
benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the
favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn
therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.See also State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112, 130 (1996);
State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J. Super. 227, 240 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 152 N.J. 187 (1997).