The court in reviewing a motion for acquittal is not
to consider evidence from the defense case. State v. Reyes,
supra. An exception is in the case of a motion for an
acquittal notwithstanding the verdict when the
defendant has been convicted of a lesser-included offense;
there, the court can look to evidence in the entire record
to support the verdict. State v. Sugar, 240 N.J. Super. 148
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 187 (1990); see also
State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 341-42 (App. Div.
1974), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72 (1975) (standard for
motion for judgment n.o.v. same as applicable to motion
for acquittal made at end of State’s case or the end of the
entire case).
The only issue on a motion for acquittal is whether
the State’s proofs, be they direct or circumstantial, are
sufficient to permit a jury to find the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DeLuca, 325 N.J.
Super. 376, 393 (App. Div. 1999), certif. granted, 163
N.J. 79 (2000); State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J. Super. at 240.
In considering such a motion, the trial court must view
the evidence most favorably to the State. State v. Milton,
255 N.J. Super. 514, 521 (App. Div. 1992).
In a habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a claim
that a person had been convicted in a state court on
insufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court should
not restrict its inquiry to whether there is any evidence to
support the conviction. In Jackson v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the court held that
defendant would be entitled to habeas corpus relief,
assuming procedural prerequisites for such a claim had
otherwise been satisfied, if it was found that upon the
record evidence adduced at trial, no rational trier of fact
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt in terms of the substantive elements of the criminal
offense as defined by state law. In reviewing a challenge
as to the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction,
the State’s right to the benefit of a reasonable inference
cannot be used to reduce the State’s burden of
establishing the essential elements of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Martinez, 97 N.J.
567 (1984).
Issues of sufficiency of the evidence often arise in cases
in which the State is alleging that the defendant was in
constructive possession of illicit drugs. The
determination of constructive possession is fact sensitive.
State v. Hurdle, 311 N.J. Super. 89, 96 (App. Div. 1998).
In State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 593 (1979), the
Supreme Court held that “where... defendant is one of
several persons found on the premises where illicit drugs
are discovered, it may not be inferred that he knew of their
presence or had control of the drugs unless there are other
circumstances or statements of the defendant tending to
permit such an inference to be drawn.” The Court in
Brown held that the total circumstances depicted by the
proofs, i.e. defendant’s presence in the apartment, and
the concealed heroin and heroin-related materials found
in the apartment, were sufficient to allow the jury to draw
relevant inferences and determine beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant had knowledge and control over
the narcotics and that narcotics trafficking took place in
defendant’s apartment. See also State v. Jackson, 326 N.J.
Super. 276, 281 (App. Div. 1999) (presence of defendant
in room insufficient to establish possession of cocaine in
dresser drawer, but evidence was sufficient to establish
possession of cocaine found in pants since jury could infer
pants belonged to the defendant); State v. Whyte, 265 N.J.
Super. 518 (App. Div.), aff’d o.b., 133 N.J. 481 (1993).In State v. Palacio, 111 N.J. 543 (1988), the Supreme
Court examined a number of factual circumstances which
provided sufficient evidence to convict the defendant, a
passenger in a vehicle found to contain drugs, of
possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. First, the jury could infer that the
driver was a drug smuggler, due to the large quantity of
drugs seized, their extraordinary monetary value, their
degree of purity, the existence of a secret storage
compartment in his car, and a slip of paper found in his
wallet indicating a drug transaction. The Court then
considered as a likely inference that the smuggler would
travel with a knowledgeable companion, the defendant,
and not an innocent passenger or stranger. The Court
further noted that the defendant and the codefendant
spoke to each other in Spanish during the stop, which was
evidential as an indication that the parties knew one
another, conversed when critical and incriminating
events were occurring, and sought to keep the
conversation concealed. See also State v. Miller, 273 N.J.
Super. 192 (App. Div. 1994) (drugs under hood of car;
defendant was front seat passenger; evidence insuffi-
cient); State v. Shipp, 216 N.J. Super. 662 (App. Div.
1987) (insufficient evidence).In State v. Binns, 222 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 111 N.J. 624 (1988), the evidence was
sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of
cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute where the defendant was the sole operator of a
rental car and possessed the keys to the truck where the
cocaine was found, distribution paraphernalia was in