State v. Martini V, 160 N.J. 248 (1999), held that the
trial court’s failure to inform the jury during penalty
phase about a capital defendant’s aggregate parole
ineligibility, which could have exceeded 30 years, did not
violate due process, where the State did not offer
defendant’s future dangerousness as an aggravating
factor, nor could it have done so, and defense counsel
effectively made argument that defendant was not likely
to live long enough to be released after 30-year period of
parole ineligibility.
State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295 (1996). Given the
unique nature of the death penalty, the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require in nearly every capital
case that sentencer not be precluded from considering, as
a mitigating factor, any aspect of defendant’s character or
record and any circumstances of offense that defendant
proffers as basis for sentence less than death. Due process
is satisfied if either trial judge or defense counsel provides
sentencing jury with relevant information about capital
defendant’s parole ineligibility.
In State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525 (1995), the decision
to seek death penalty after offering plea to life sentence
was not abuse of prosecutorial discretion; prosecution’s
original decision to proceed with trial as capital case
continued to be appropriate when defendant chose not to
plead.
In State v. Martini I, 131 N.J. 176 (1993), defendant
was not denied his rights to due process, equal protection
and fair trial under Federal and State Constitutions when
trial court informed prospective jurors in capital murder
case that defendant was incarcerated in county jail, where
instructions were designed to ensure that jurors would
not draw negative inferences from defendant’s status or
from presence of sheriff’s officers. The trial court did not
deprive defendant of his due process right to reliable
sentencing procedure or subject defendant to cruel and
unusual punishment by not instructing jurors during
penalty phase of capital murder trial that alternative to
death sentence possibly included period of parole
ineligibility in excess of 30 years, based on defendant’s
kidnapping conviction; defendant had not yet been
sentenced for kidnapping, and defense counsel did not
request such instruction.
State v. Biegenwald IV, 126 N.J. 1 (1991), held that
exclusion for cause of a potential juror because he
acknowledged that imposing death penalty would be
“very difficult” did not deny defendant his right to due
process and fair and impartial jury during resentencing in
capital murder prosecution; potential juror indicated his
dissatisfaction with limited sentencing options available
and could not say he could sentence person to death even
in case of gruesome killing, providing basis for trial
court’s decision that his ability to act as juror would be
substantially impaired. Application of “depravity of
mind” statutory aggravating factor during sentencing
phase of capital murder trial did not violate due process
on grounds defendant was not given notice of conduct
that could produce capital verdict; any notice
requirement was fulfilled by use of “other murder
conviction” aggravating factor.In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987),
defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not infringed
by
the “death qualification” of the jury in his joint trial with
codefendant against whom the death penalty was sought.
Kentucky had a legitimate interest in a joint trial where
the conduct of defendants arose from the same events,
and a single jury would obtain a more complete view of
the conduct and could reach a decision as to both
defendants in both phases and assess the appropriateness
of the death penalty for codefendant.C. Discovery and DisclosureState v Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2000).
Brady disclosure rule applies only to information of
which the prosecution is actually or constructively aware.
To establish a Brady violation, defendant must show
that: (1) prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) evidence is
favorable to the defense; and (3) evidence is material.
“Exculpatory evidence” includes not only material that is
directly exculpatory of a defendant, but also evidence that
may impeach credibility of a state witness. Materiality
standard is satisfied if defendant demonstrates that there
is a reasonable probability that had evidence been
disclosed to the defense, result of proceeding would have
been different. Court must look to aggregate of evidence
suppressed, rather than view in isolation the impact of
each discrete item withheld. Issue of materiality is a
mixed question of law and fact, and therefore, trial judge’s
conclusion is not entitled to same deference as judge’s
factual findings.The seminal case regarding the prosecutor’s duty to
disclose evidence is Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). There, the Court held that suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused following
a defense request, violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment, regardless of
the prosecutor’s good faith or bad faith. See also Strickler
v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.