Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). Based on
the requirement of impartiality embodied in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital
defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror
who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every
case, and thus will fail in good faith to consider evidence
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as required
by jury instructions.
In Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991), due
process was violated at sentencing procedure in Idaho
murder case, where defendant and his counsel did not
have adequate notice that judge might sentence him to
death. Nothing in record after state’s response to
presentencing order, which formally advised that state
would not recommend death penalty, and before judge’s
remarks at end of sentencing hearing indicated that judge
contemplated death as possible sentence or alerted
parties that real issue at hearing was choice between life
and death. It was reasonable for defense to assume that
there was no reason to present argument or evidence
directed at death penalty.
In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), a
sentencing scheme did not violate Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments insofar as it placed on accused
burden of proving by preponderance of evidence
existence of mitigating circumstances or provided that
sentencing court “shall impose” death penalty if one or
more aggravating circumstances were found and
mitigating circumstances were held insufficient to call for
leniency.
In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), a
capital murder defendant did not have an unqualified
liberty interest under the due process clause to have the
jury assess consequence of invalidation of one of the
aggravating circumstances on which it had been
instructed, as state court had authority under state law to
decide for itself whether death sentence was to be
affirmed and was not bound to vacate death sentence and
to remand for a resentencing proceeding before a jury.
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990). An instruction
to avoid any influence of sympathy when imposing
sentence in capital murder case did not run afoul of
principle that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit State from barring relevant mitigating evidence
from being presented and considered during penalty
phase of capital trial.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Special issue
of future dangerousness in sentencing phase of capital
murder trial under Texas law did not provide vehicle for
jury to give mitigating effect to defendant’s evidence of
mental retardation and childhood abuse, as required by
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment; even if retardation
and abuse diminished defendant’s blameworthiness, it at
same time could indicate that there was probability that
he would be dangerous in future. It is precisely because
punishment should be directly related to personal
culpability of defendant that jury must be allowed to
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to
defendant’s character or record or circumstances of
offense; rather than creating risk of unguided emotional
response, full consideration of evidence that mitigates
against death penalty is essential if jury is to give reasoned
moral response to defendant’s background, character,
and crime, as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), held that
neither Eighth Amendment nor due process clause
requires states to appoint counsel for indigent death row
inmates seeking state post-conviction relief.Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
Combination of polling of jury and supplemental
instruction encouraging jury to reach verdict as to
penalty in capital murder prosecution was not coercive in
such a way as to deny defendant any constitutional right,
including due process and rights under the Eighth
Amendment, despite the fact that one purpose served by
such a charge, avoiding the societal costs of retrial, was not
present in that state law provided that if jury did not
decide, court would impose sentence of life
imprisonment, since State has interest in having jury
express the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death. The polling of the jury did not
ask for numerical division of jurors on how they stood on
the merits, but how they stood on the question of
whether further deliberations might assist them in
returning a verdict.In Summer v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987), neither
Nevada’s interest in deterrence or retribution justified
the mandatory imposition of a death sentence for inmate
convicted of murder who was serving a life term since a
guided discretion sentencing procedure which provides
for consideration of individualized factors fulfills these
goals while protecting the defendant’s constitutional
rights. The mandatory capital sentencing provision
precluded consideration of factors which may have called
for a less severe sentence.