cdTOCtest

inform a prisoner that criminal charges have been
brought against him in another state, and the 30 day
period affords a reasonable time within which to contest
the legality of his delivery. State v. Thompson, supra; Cf.
State v. Masselli, 43 N.J. 1 (1964) (the 30 day period is
measured from the time of the warden’s receipt of request
for custody). In overruling Thompson in part, however,
the Supreme Court held in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433
(1981), that whereas a prisoner initiating the transfer
procedure under Article III waives rights which the
sending state affords persons being extradited, including
rights provided under the Extradition Act, a prisoner’s
extradition rights are preserved when the receiving state
seeks his involuntary transfer under Article IV of the
Detainer Agreement. Cf. N.J.S.A. 2A:160-18 (right to a
hearing).

III. CUSTODIAL CREDIT PURSUANT TO R.

3:21-8

R. 3:21-8 provides “[t]he defendant shall receive
credit on the term of a custodial sentence for any time he
has served in custody in jail or in a state hospital between
his arrest and the imposition of sentence.”

Where a prisoner suffers no additional restriction on
his freedom as a result of a detainer filed against him, he
is not entitled to credit on a subsequent sentence.

Unexpressed in R. 3:21-8, but the key to its
application, is the requirement that the presentence
confinement be “directly attributable to the particular
offenses” for which sentence is being imposed. State v.
Allen, 155 N.J. Super. 582, 584 (App. Div. 1979). In
other words, a defendant may not receive credit for time
served attributable to an unrelated offense, even though
that confinement occurs between arrest and sentencing
for the offense in question. State v. Lynk, supra; see, e.g.,
State v. Allen, supra (no credit for confinement in out-of-
county New Jersey jail while awaiting disposition of
unrelated charges pending there), and State v. Council,
137 N.J. Super. 306, 308 (App. Div. 1975) (no credit for
confinement in federal penitentiary where defendant
serving federal sentence). See also, State v. Jones, 184 N.J.
Super. 626 (Law Div. 1982) (no credit for confinement
where bail not revoked and no warrant or detainer
prevented defendant’s release with respect to those
charges). See also State v. Mercadante, 299 N.J. Super.
522, 534 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 150 N.J. 26 (1997)
(defendant not entitled to credit for time attributable to
federal probation but was entitled to credit for custodial
time after expiration of federal parole sentence); State v.
Black, 153 N.J. 438, 456 (1998). Detention pursuant
to IAD does not entitle a defendant to jail credits where

the incarceration was attributable to a sentence in

another State, not to indictments in State. State v. Dela

Rosa, 327 N.J. Super. 295, 297 (App. Div. 2000).

A defendant is entitled to credit, however, where he

suffers additional restrictions on his freedom as a result of

a detainer filed against him.

Where defendant was detained in a foreign penal

institution after his latest release date as the result of a

New Jersey detainer, it was held, upon his subsequent

New Jersey conviction, that he was entitled to credit on

his sentence for time spent in foreign custody whether the

original action taken by New Jersey officials found its

source in the robbery charges or the violation of parole

charge then pending against defendant. State v. Beatty,

128 N.J. Super. 488 (App. Div. 1974). However, it has

been held that a detainer based on a probation violation

does not fall within the ambit of Article III of the Detainer

Agreement. Carchman v. Nash, supra. In any event, a

defendant resisting extradition to New Jersey cannot be

denied credit for time served in the foreign jurisdiction

since such denial would chill his constitutional right to

contest extradition. State v. Johnson, 167 N.J. Super. 62

(App. Div. 1979), certif. den. 87 N.J..419 (1981).

(For additional cases and text concerning the

application of this rule, see also SENTENCING and

EXTRADITION, this Digest.)

IV. SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROCEDURAL

RIGHTS

A. Speedy Trial

The 180 day period encompassed within Article III

of the Detainer Agreement, requiring dismissal of a

criminal prosecution for the state’s failure to bring

defendant to trial within 180 days of his formal request

therefore, is merely the statutory analogue to the date

fixed by the court in nonstatutory cases for trial of an

indictment on demand of defendant for a speedy trial.

State v. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div. 1969),

rev’d o.g., 55 N.J. 354 (1970). The right to a speedy trial

as guaranteed by the State Constitution is the right to

move for such a trial and to have the indictment dismissed

after the state fails to proceed at a time for trial fixed by

the court. Id.

In State v. Holmes, 214 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div.

1986), the State appealed from an order dismissing the

indictment returned against defendant on the basis that

the State failed to comply with N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3a.