given inaccurate information regarding the action he
should take with respect to his outstanding detainer by
the county prosecutor’s office, acting upon instructions
by the court, and defendant relied on their advice and
followed their instructions carefully to his detriment.
Carchman v. Nash, supra. In any event, the 180 day
period provided by this section for commencement of
trial after proper request cannot be triggered earlier than
defendant’s sentencing date, although defendant can
provide notice to the appropriate authorities before that
time, and his demand for speedy disposition of the
charges is then effective as of his sentencing. Id. New York
v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 , 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560
(2000), holds that a defense counsel’s agreement to a trial
date outside the IAD period bars the defendant from
seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur
within that period. A defendant must give notice or
make a demand for trial as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-
3a. Such notice and demand is mandatory to invoke the
agreement provisions requiring the trial to commence
before the prisoner’s return to the original place of
confinement. N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-3d. The procedures for
compliance with the IAD are to be strictly complied. See
State v. Stiles, 233 N.J. Super. at 306.
Article III provides for the tolling of the 180 day
period if a continuance is granted or if defendant is
unavailable to stand trial. The statute does not expressly
limit the time within which a continuance may be
granted to this 180 day period, but provides “[t]hat for
good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of
the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance” at any time prior to the actual entry of an
order dismissing the indictment pursuant to Article V
(N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-5c). See State v. Lippolis, 55 N.J. 354
(1970), rev’g on dissent, 107 N.J. Super. 137, 147 (App.
Div. 1969). Cf. State v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379 (App.
Div. 1963) (sections of the Detainer Agreement
providing for dismissal of indictments are not self-
executing: the interstate agreement contemplates a
judicial proceeding). The question of whether good cause
exists for a continuance must be resolved from a
consideration of the totality of circumstances in the
particular case upon the background of the consider-
ations which motivated the Agreement as expressed in
Article 1 (N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1). State v. Lippolis, supra;
Cf. State v. Johnson, 188 N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div.
1982) (Lippolis standard applies to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-4c
as to what circumstances will constitute “good cause” for
a continuance). Moreover, despite demand for
disposition by a defendant the 180 day period is properly
tolled with respect to New Jersey charges during the
period that defendant was imprisoned in another state
pending resolution of those charges pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2A:159A-6a. State v. Binn, 196 N.J. Super. 102 (Law
Div. 1984). In State v. Binn, 208 N.J. Super. 443 (App.
Div. 1986), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 471 (1986),
modifying 196 N.J. Super. 102 (Law Div. 1984), the
Appellate Division held that it cannot be suggested that
a defendant can request speedy trial in various
jurisdictions simultaneously and then complain that his
Sixth Amendment rights are violated by the absence of
contemporaneous dispositions. IAD prescriptions
requiring defendant to be brought to trial within 180
days after delivery to the prosecutor in receiving state of
notice of place of imprisonment and request for final
disposition, did not apply after defendant was released
from prison in sending state. State v. Rodriguez, 239 N.J.
Super. 455 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 321
(1990). Outstanding charges pending in a sending state
renders a defendant “unable to stand trial” in the
receiving state and, thus, will toll statutory time period
within which defendant must be brought to trial under
IAD. State v. Cook, 330 N.J. Super. 395 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 165 N.J. 486 (2000); State v. Miller, 299
N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 1997).B. Article IVUnder Article IV, the State must bring a defendant
to trial “[w]ithin 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in
the receiving State....”Article IV provides for the tolling of the 120 day
period if the defendant is unavailable to stand trial or a
continuance is granted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-
4c. The question of whether good cause exists for the
continuance of a criminal prosecution beyond 120 days
after defendant’s arrival in this state pursuant to the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers must be resolved in
consideration of the totality of the circumstances in the
particular case and background of considerations which
motivated the Detainer Agreement. State v. Johnson, 188
N.J. Super. 416 (App. Div. 1982).Article IV requires a waiting period of 30 days after
receipt by the appropriate authorities in the custodial
state of a request for temporary custody during “[w]hich
period the Governor of the sending State may disapprove
the request for temporary custody or availability, either
upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner”
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-4a. If the prisoner does
not move to contest the legality of his delivery within this
period, he waives his right to do so, since under the
statutory scheme the filing of a detainer is designed to