- Insanity
It is within trial judge’s discretion to refuse to permit
voir dire questioning on prospective juror’s attitudes
toward a substantive defense, such as insanity. State v.
Kelly, 118 N.J.Super. 38, 50-51 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 60 N.J. 350 (1972).
C. Number of Peremptory Challenges See N.J.S.A.
2B:23-13 and R. 1:8-3(d).
IV. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUROR
N.J.S.A. 2C:51-3 disqualifies a person convicted of a
crime from serving as a juror. See N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1, 9 and
- One who has been pardoned may serve, however.
Storcella v. New Jersey, 296 N.J.Super. 238, 243-44 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 141 (1997).
Where juror asks to be disqualified, trial judge must
ascertain basis for request out of jury’s presence, but with
all counsel present, before ruling. State v. Lemon, 107
N.J.Super. 101, 107 (App. Div. 1969).
Court has authority to remove juror after defense
counsel indicated juror was sleeping during his
summation. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 491
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997); State v.
Reevey, 159 N.J.Super. 130, 133-35 (App. Div.)
(remanded to hold hearing to determine accuracy of
allegation), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 471 (1978).
Verdict cannot be upset or voided by virtue of
ineligible juror’s participation in the absence of an
objection following voir dire which reveals ineligibility.
State v. McNamara, 212 N.J.Super. 102, 106-07 (App.
Div. 1986), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 (1987) (juror had
served on another jury within one year of defendant’s
trial, contrary to then N.J.S.A. 2A:69-4, but defendant,
who was aware of this fact, never exercised a challenge for
cause); compare, State v. Pereira, 202 N.J.Super. at 438.
V. ALTERNATES; SUBSTITUTION See R. 1:8-
2 (d).
A. Generally
State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392 (1978), upholds the
constitutionality of R. 1:8-2(d), emphasizing the
requirement that the jury be instructed after substitution
is made that deliberations must begin anew. See also State
v. Holloway, 288 N.J.Super. 390, 403 (App. Div. 1996).
Failure to instruct the jury on the necessity to
recommence deliberations constitutes plain error
requiring reversal of defendant’s convictions. State v.
Trent, 79 N.J. 251 (1979); State v. Anderson, 173
N.J.Super. 75 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 124
(1980). Requirement that 12 persons reach unanimous
verdict is not met unless they reach their consensus
through deliberations which are the common experience
of all of them. State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 349 (1987);
State v. Trent, 79 N.J. at 256. Rule was intended to strike
a balance between need for judicial economy and
defendant’s fair trial rights. State v. Valenzuela, 136 N.J.
458, 467 (1994); State v. Phillips, 322 N.J.Super. 429,
436 (App. Div. 1999).
Juror bias discovered before deliberations commence
generally results in discharge of offending juror, but once
case has gone to the jury the taint calls for a mistrial. State
v. Hightower, 146 N.J. 239, 254-56 (1996); State v.
Adams, 320 N.J.Super. 360, 366-67 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 161 N.J. 333 (1999). Discharge of juror and
substitution during deliberations is permitted sparingly,
and only where the juror falls ill or otherwise is unable to
continue for strictly personal reason; juror’s interaction
with other jurors does not suffice. State v. Valenzuela, 136
N.J. at 468; State v. Williams, 336 N.J. Super, 115, 120
(App. Div. 2000); State v. Adams, 320 N.J.Super. at 367;
State v. Singleton, 290 N.J.Super. 336, 347 (App. Div.
1996).
B. Examples
- Substitution of a juror after the return of partial
verdicts for the purpose of continuing deliberations to
reach final verdicts on the remaining counts is plain error.
State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. at 352-54. - Juror’s removal during deliberations unwarranted
where she mentioned a bad experience with the police
and smiled at defendant. These factors did not render her
“unable to continue,” as that phrase has been narrowly
construed, pursuant to R. 1:8-2(d)(1). State v. Cruz, 330
N.J.Super. 274, 280 (App. Div. 2000); see State v.
Hightower, 146 N.J. at 254; State v. Valenzuela, 136 N.J.
at 468; State v. Phillips, 322 N.J.Super. at 436-42. - Defendant’s right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy is not violated when a juror is substituted
during or after counsel’s opening statements but before
the presentation of evidence, so long as the replacement
juror is fully acquainted with the opening statements. R.
1:8-2(d), which permits the replacement of jurors only
before the opening statements, is not implicated since