Prior convictions are used for the limited purpose of
attacking the defendant’s credibility and cannot be used
to suggest that the individual is prone to violence or is a
bad person and thus likely to have committed the offense
for which he or she is being tried. State v. Thomas, 140
N.J. Super. 429, 447 (App. Div. 1976), rev’d on o.g., 76
N.J. 344 (1978).
Only adult convictions may be used for general
impeachment purposes. State v. Laws, 50 N.J. 159, 178-
79 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 971, 89 S. Ct. 408, 21
L.Ed.2d 384 (1968); Application of Hart, 265 N.J. Super.
285, 291 (Law Div. 1993). Disorderly persons
convictions cannot be used for impeachment purposes.
State v. Tune, 17 N.J. 100, 109-111 (1954); State v. B.C.,
235 N.J. Super. 157, 160 (Law. Div. 1989).
In narcotics prosecution, error in admission of
officer’s hearsay testimony as to informer’s information
that defendant possessed narcotics was not harmless,
although evidence was sufficient for conviction. State v.
Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973).
A prosecutor may not comment as to defendant’s
post-arrest silence to impeach his exculpatory story at
trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240,49
L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 115-16
(1976); State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 118 (1991); State
v. Lyle, 73 N.J. 403, 410 (1977); State v. Pierce, 330 N.J.
Super. 479, 490-92 (App. Div. 2000). However, there
is a distinction between the kind of silence that enjoys
constitutional protection and silence that constitutes
conduct inconsistent with a defendant’s trial testimony.
In State v. Burt, 59 N.J. 156 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047, 92 S. Ct. 728, 30 L.Ed.2d 735 (1972), defendant
was charged with shooting a friend and said at trial the
shooting had been accidental. The cross-examination at
trial established that the defendant had not sought
assistance for his injured friend after the incident, had left
the locale without knowing whether he was dead or alive
and had not reported the occurrence to the police when
he was arrested for another offense a few hours later. The
court concluded that this was not a true case of silence in
police custody as to an exculpatory story, but rather one
of conduct, albeit non-action, inconsistent with
defendant’s story at trial. See also State v. Brown, 118 N.J.
595 (1990)(minimal cross-examination regarding
defendant’s pre-arrest failure to report to police that he
had been driving a car in a fatal collision was permissible
for impeachment purposes -- particularly since there was
no official, pre-arrest interrogation involved).
A prosecutor cannot cross examine a defendant in any
way calculated to have him or her characterize the other
witnesses as liars. State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361, 378
(App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 163 N.J. 140 (2000).It is improper for a prosecutor to use a defendant’s
poverty to establish a criminal motive. State v. Mathis, 47
N.J. 455, 469-72 (1966); State v. Stewart, 162 N.J.
Super. 96, 100 (App. Div. 1978). Courts have permitted
admission of evidence concerning sudden monetary
acquisition or improvement in financial condition by an
accused in prosecutions for crimes which naturally and
ordinarily result in the acquisition of money, provided
there is other evidence of the defendant’s guilt. State v.
Smollock, 148 N.J. Super. 382, 386 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 74 N.J. 274 (1977).VI. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
The court must grant defendant’s motion to dismiss
the complaint where the prosecutor, for the second time,
was not ready to proceed with trial because he had failed
to obtain evidence and to subpoena witnesses and
because, on both occasions, he failed to notify defendant
of need for postponements. State v. Perkins, 219 N.J.
Super. 121 (Law Div. 1987). In State v. Farrell, 320 N.J.
Super. 425, 509 (App. Div. 1999, the court vacated
defendant’s Municipal Court convictions after multiple
postponements, the majority of which were the fault of
the prosecution or the court, and after defendant had
invoked his right to a speedy trial eight times. Id.It was egregious misconduct for prosecutors to
instruct police officers to dispense with Miranda
warnings, and such misconduct required the exclusion of
defendant’s statement even for impeachment purposes.
State v. Sosinski, 331 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 2000).While during the course of preparations for trial the
State has the right to attempt to obtain further evidence
favorable to the prosecution, it is not entitled to obtain
information resulting from the efforts of the defense.
Information regarding whether defendant received a pair
of sneakers while incarcerated in the county jail, however,
was not the subject of any reasonable expectation of
privacy and was not privileged; nor did it reveal any trial
strategy on the part of the defense. State v. Weston, 216
N.J. Super. 543 (Law. Div. 1986). Before subpoenaing
certain records from a county jail concerning a defendant
on trial (i.e. “medical records, the names and
relationships of visitors, and description of the various
items which visitors brought to or from the jail”), the