involve the Fourth Amendment. Solem, 465 U.S. at 643
n.3, 104 S.Ct. at 1341 n.3. The Court then went on to
consider the Linkletter/Stovall factors and held that
Edwards would not be applied retroactively to cases
involving collateral review of final convictions. Id. at 641-
51, 104 S.Ct. at 1341-1346. In Solemn, the Court
ultimately ruled that Edwards was not retroactive to a
conviction that had become final. See Shea v. Louisiana,
470 U.S. 51, 105 S.Ct. 1065 (1985) (Edwards v. Arizona
was applicable to cases pending on direct appeal at the time
Edwards was decided). See also Tate v. Rose, 466 U.S. 1301,
104 S.Ct. 2186 (1984)(decision granting stay); Mack v.
Oklahoma, 459 U.S. 900, 103 S.Ct. 201 (1982)(memoran-
dum decision).
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708
(1987), the United States Supreme Court again addressed
federal retroactivity law, and it abandoned the Linkletter/
Stovall three-pronged retroactivity approach in cases
pending direct review. Id. at 320-22, 107 S.Ct. 711-13.
The Griffith Court also departed from the “clear break”
retroactivity standard enunciated in Johnson and found
that “the fact that the new rule may constitute a clear break
with the past has no bearing on the ‘actual inequity that
results’ when only one of many similarly situated
defendants receives the benefit of the new rule.” Id. at 327-
28, 107 S.Ct. at 716. The Griffith Court held that “a new
rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending
on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases
in which the rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”
Id. at 328, 107 S.Ct. at 716.
More recently in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109
S.Ct. 1060 (1989), the Court revisited retroactivity and
distinguished the retroactive application of a new rule of
law in a direct appeal from the retroactive application of a
new rule of law on collateral attack. The Teague Court
concluded that on collateral attack, a new rule of law is to
be applied retroactively only where the rule represents a
clear break with the past and meets one of two conditions:
(1) the new rule places “certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe[;]” or (2) the new rule
requires “the observance of ‘those procedures that ... are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at 311, 109
S.Ct. at 1075-76 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 692-93, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1180 (1971)). See
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372-73, 113 S.Ct. 838,
844 (1993) (Teague retroactivity rule does not apply to
claims raised by a federal habeas petitioner). At this point,
the federal standard for retroactivity is stricter than the
New Jersey standard for relief when a defendant seeks to
collaterally attack a prior judgment of conviction.
Nonetheless, to the extent that retroactivity arises in the
context of criminal-procedure decisions implicating rights
guaranteed under the federal constitution, United States
Supreme Court precedent controls the scope of
retroactivity. See State v. Purnell, 161 N.J. 44, 59-60
(1999); State v. Lark, 117 N.J. 331, 335 (1989).See also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 113 S.Ct.
2112 (1993); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.
1999); In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 1999); United
States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d at 350.B. State Retroactivity LawNew Jersey’s retroactivity analysis is generally
consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court,
except that New Jersey law is more liberal than that of the
federal courts. State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 57 (1997);
State v. Cupe, 289 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 144 N.J. 589 (1996). Under New Jersey law, the
starting point for any retroactivity analysis is “whether the
rule at issue is a ‘new rule of law’ for purposes of
retroactivity analysis.” Purnell, 161 N.J. at 53; Afanador,
151 N.J. at 57; State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 249 (1996).
If there is no new rule of law, the issue of retroactivity never
arises and the court’s power to limit the retroactive effect of
a decision is not implicated. Purnell, 161 N.J. at 53;
Afanador, 151 N.J. at 57; Burstein, 85 N.J. at 403. For a
decision to be deemed a new rule of law for retroactivity
purposes, “there must be a ‘sudden and generally
unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing practice.’”
Purnell, 161 N.J. at 53; Cupe, 289 N.J. Super. at 11-12.Once a decision is deemed a new rule of law, our
Supreme Court delineated the process the court should
undertake to determine retroactive effect. In Knight, 145
N.J. at 251-53, the New Jersey Supreme Court reinforced
New Jersey’s continued acceptance of the Linkletter/Stovall
standard for assessing retroactivity decisions, and to date,
that analysis remains the prevailing New Jersey law. As
previously stated, once a decision is a new rule of law, the
three factors under the Linkletter/Stovall test are: (1) the
purpose of the rule, (2) the degree of reliance placed upon
the old rule, and (3) the effect retroactive effect would have
on the administration of justice. Purnell, 161 N.J. at 58;
Knight, 145 N.J. at 251-53; State v. Abronski, 145 N.J. 265,
265-67 (1996); Lark, 117 N.J. at 339-40; Nash, 64 N.J. at
471.