cdTOCtest

1. Purpose to be served.

“The purpose of the new rule is often the pivotal
consideration.” Knight, 145 N.J. at 251; Burstein, 85 N.J.
at 406. There are different classes of purposes that a new
rule may advance. Purnell, 161 N.J. at 54. A new rule may
be decided to deter police misconduct, where its purpose
would not be served by retroactive application to past
misconduct. Id.; Knight, 145 N.J. at 251; Burstein, 85 N.J.
at 406. In other cases, “if the old rule was altered because
it substantially impaired the reliability of the truth-finding
process, the interest in obtaining accurate verdicts may
suggest that the new rule be given complete retroactive
effect.” Knight, 145 N.J. at 251.

2. Extent of reliance upon old rule by law enforcement
   agencies in performance of their professional responsibili-
   ties.

The second factor considers whether law enforcement
agents justifiably relied on the old rule in performing their
professional responsibilities. Purnell, 161 N.J. at 55; State
v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 447 (1981). The basic reasoning
underlying this inquiry is that state agents should not be
penalized for complying in good faith with “prevailing
constitutional norms” when carrying out their duties. State
v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 582 (Pashman, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 44 U.S. 994, 100 S.Ct. 527 (1979); Abronski, 145
N.J. at 268; Catania, 85 N.J. at 447-48. However, when
prior judicial decisions provide state officials with reasons
to question the continued validity of the old rule, the
significance of the law enforcement officers’ reliance
correspondingly decreases. See Nash, 64 N.J. at 473-74.

3. Effect upon the administration of justice.

This factor recognizes that courts must not impose
unjustified burdens on our criminal justice system. Knight,
145 N.J. at 252; Burstein, 85 N.J. at 410. Generally new
rules will not be applied retroactively when such an
application would undermine the validity of large numbers
of convictions, overwhelm courts with retrials, and present
difficulty in re-prosecuting cases where the offense took
place years ago. See State v. Clark, 162 N.J. 201, 207-08
(2000); Purnell, 161 N.J. at 56; State v. Brimage, 153 N.J.
1, 26 (1998); Abronski, 145 N.J. at 268; Knight, 145 N.J. at
252; Lark, 117 N.J. at 341; Burstein, 85 N.J. at 410.

II. DEGREE OF RETROACTIVE EFFECT

Once a new rule of law is involved, courts can
undertake a variety of approaches to determine the
retroactive effect of decisions in the criminal field which

recognize or create new rights of persons investigated,

charged with or prosecuted for crime. The approach

adopted has depended largely on the court’s view of what is

just and consonant with public policy of the particular

situation presented and application of the Linkletter/Stovall

criteria. The categories of rules which have evolved are as

follows:

1. Hold that the overruling decision operates
   prospectively only and it does not apply to parties involved
   in the case that is declaring the new rule of law.


2. Apply the new rule to the parties involved in the case
   announcing the new rule and to future cases, while
   applying the old rule to all other pending and past
   litigation.


3. Grant the new rule limited retroactivity, applying it
   to the parties of the new case and all other pending cases
   where the parties have not yet exhausted all avenues of
   direct review.


4. Give the rule complete retroactive effect, applying it
   to all cases, even those where final judgments have been
   entered and all avenues of direct appeal have been
   exhausted.

III. SECOND-STAGE RETROACTIVITY

“The second-stage retroactivity issue consists in the

circumstances that defendant’s present effort to invalidate

his 1965 conviction upon the basis of a 1966 decision of

the United States Supreme Court arises in the context, not

of a North Dakota (or federal habeas) proceeding directly

aimed at vacating the conviction, but of an effort to

invalidate a 1970 New Jersey conviction because of the use

by the State of the 1965 conviction to affect defendant’s

credibility in that 1970 trial.” State v. Lueder, 74 N.J. 62,

83-84 (1977). See State v. Koch, 118 N.J. Super. 421 (App.

Div. 1972).

IV. SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF RETROAC-

TIVITY CRITERIA

A. Search and Seizure

United States v. Johnson, 466 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct. 2579

(1982) (finding that Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100

S.Ct. 1371 (1980), which prohibited law enforcement

officers from making warrantless and nonconsensual

entries into a suspect’s home to make a routine felony

arrest, was given retroactive effect).