People v. Rasmussen, 478 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Mich. App.
1991).
In determining whether there has been an
abandonment of privacy interests in the property, the
critical inquiry is whether the person prejudiced by the
search voluntarily discarded, left behind or otherwise
relinquished interest in the property so that no reasonable
expectation of privacy was retained in the property at the
time of the search. United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d
1510, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Reed
v. United States, 506 U.S. 924 (1992); United States v.
Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 603 (11th Cir. 1990). The facts
and circumstances relevant to the court’s abandonment
inquiry are not limited to those known to the officers at the
time of the search. Rather, subsequently discovered events
may support an inference that the defendant chose and
manifested an intent not to return to the property. Id. at
604; State v. List, 270 N.J. Super. at 259-60. Discarding
property after an unreasonable seizure does not constitute
abandonment. State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 171-72
(1994).
B. Automobile Cases
- Stops
The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the
person, including brief investigatory stops of vehicles.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690,
694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). In order to stop an
automobile, a police officer need only have reasonable
suspicion that a crime or traffic offense is being or has been
committed. Id. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621;
United States v. Olafson, 203 F.3d 560, 563 (9th Cir.
2000); State v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. 452, 463 (1999); State v.
Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). The totality of the
circumstances must be evaluated in determining whether
the police have a particularized and objective basis for the
stop. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at
695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621. It is unnecessary to prove that a
motor vehicle violation occurred to justify a stop for failure
to signal. The police need only have a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that failure to signal is likely to affect
traffic. State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 304 (1994); State
v. Jones, 326 N.J. Super. 234, 244 (App. Div. 1999) (traffic
conditions justified stop but police had no valid reason to
search interior of car).
Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer is aware of
specific, articulable facts which, when combined with
reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the
particular person to be detained has committed or is about
to commit an offense. United States v. Olafson, 203 F.3d at- The facts are to be interpreted in light of a trained
officer’s experience. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8,
109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). While
reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause “and requires a showing considerably less
than preponderance of the evidence,” Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675-76, 145 L.Ed.2d
570 (2000), the constitution requires at least a minimal
level of objective justification for making the stop. Id. at
124, 120 S.Ct. at 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570. The officer must
be able to articulate more than a “hunch” that criminal
activity is afoot. Id.
Reasonable suspicion for a stop need not be based
solely on the officer’s personal observations. The police
may rely upon a flyer or bulletin issued by fellow law
enforcement personnel to justify a stop to check
identification, pose questions or briefly detain a suspect
while attempting to obtain further information. The
critical question is whether the issuing jurisdiction had
reasonable suspicion to believe that the wanted person had
committed an offense. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.
221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). See
also State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623,634 (App. Div.
2000) (stop of defendant justified by information received
from another police officer that car in which defendant was
passenger was being driven by driver with a revoked
license).Once the car is properly stopped, the federal
constitution permits an officer to request, without any
particularized showing, that a car’s driver, Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.Ed.2d
331 (1977), and passenger, Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S.
408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 37 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997), exit the vehicle
for safety reasons. New Jersey follows Mimms with regard
to ordering the driver out of the car.However, when the police ask the passenger to exit,
they must have reasons to do so because “the passenger has
not engaged in the culpable conduct that resulted in the
vehicle’s stop.” State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 615 (1994).
In order to support an order to a passenger to exit, the
police need not point to specific facts that the occupants are
armed and dangerous. Rather, the officer need point only
to some fact or facts in the totality of the circumstances that
would create in an officer a heightened awareness of danger
that would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in
securing the scene in a more effective manner by ordering
the passenger out of the car. Id. at 618. This cannot be
based on a hunch; instead, the officer must be able to
articulate why the passenger’s gestures or other