evidence. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337, 110 S.Ct.
1093, 1099-1100, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1996); State v. Henry,
133 N.J. at 118.
Where a home has been turned into a commercial drug
outlet to which outsiders have been invited, it has lost its
nature as a home for purposes of the constitution. Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17
L.Ed.2d 312, 316 (1966); State v. Henry, 133 N.J. at 116-
17.
If an emergency situation exists, no warrant for entry
into a home is required under general fourth amendment
principles. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717-18,
104 S.Ct. 3296, 3304-05, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). The
emergency exception applies when the purpose of the
police entry is not to gather evidence of criminal activity
but rather to respond immediately to a need for assistance
for the protection of life or property. State v. Pante, 325
N.J. Super. 336, 352 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163
N.J. 76 (1999) (when police saw blasting and demolition
materials in hallway, they had right to search defendant’s
bedroom because of public safety exigency); State v.
Garland, 270 N.J. Super. 31, 44-46 (App. Div. 1994),
certif. denied, 136 N.J. 296 (1994) (police properly entered
hotel room, where saw and seized drugs, because believed
children there alone).
There is no precise formula to determine whether an
emergency situation exists but the existence of the
emergency is determined as of the moment of warrantless
entry onto the premises. The courts should consider the
appearance of the scene of the search as it would appear to
a reasonably prudent person in the police officer’s shoes.
United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641, 642 (4th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 960 (1991). The police may make a
warrantless entry onto the premises where they reasonably
believe a person is in need of immediate aid. Thompson v.
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S.Ct. 409, 411, 83 L.Ed.2d
409 (1984); State v. Castro, 238 N.J. Super. 482, 488 (App.
Div. 1990).
A warrantless search of a hospital room for drugs was
justified by exigent circumstances because patients and
others had access to the room and could have retrieve the
contraband. State v. Stott, 335 N.J. Super.611 (App. Div.
2000), certif. granted, N.J. (2001).
There is no “murder scene” exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of a warrant for a home entry.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 384, 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2415,
57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); State v. Damplias, 282 N.J. Super.
471, 481 (App. Div. 1995).
E. Community Caretaking Function
In addition to investigating crimes, the police also
engage in a community caretaking function which is
“totally divorced” from the detection, investigation or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a
criminal statute. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441,
93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); State v.
Garbin, 325 N.J. Super. 521, 526-27 (App. Div. 1999);
State v. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. 104, 109-10 (App. Div.
1998), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 382 (1998). The need to
protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what otherwise would be illegal action,
State v. Garbin, 325 N.J. Super. at 525-26 (quotation
omitted), such as warrantless entry into a home. Id. at 525.
The community caretaking function cannot be overbear-
ing or harassing in nature. State v. Drummond, 305 N.J.
Super. 84, 88-89 (App. Div. 1997).
Where an officer was on the premises to investigate a
report of a possible fire and observed smoke billowing from
the garage, he was justified in entering the garage without a
warrant. State v. Garbin, 325 N.J. Super. at 526-27.
Similarly, police who accompanied defendant’s landlady
into his apartment where she believed a gun was secreted
were performing a community caretaking function, since
the presence of the gun in the apartment might lead to
violence. State v. Navarro, 310 N.J. Super. at 108-09. A
police officer who stopped a driver proceeding at a snail’s
pace because he considered the conduct abnormal was
acting properly under his community caretaking function.
State v. Martinez, 260 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1992).
However, stopping a defendant who was sitting with a
friend in a parked car in a tavern parking lot while the
tavern was open was not an appropriate community
caretaking function. State v. Costa, 327 N.J. Super. 22, 29
(App. Div. 1999). Similarly, stopping a defendant because
he failed to proceed for five seconds after a red light turned
green could not be justified under a community caretaking
analysis. State v. Cryan, 320 N.J. Super. 325, 331 (App.
Div. 1999).
F. Independent Source
The independent source doctrine permits the State to
utilize evidence which was derived from a lawful source
independent of the illegal conduct. Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183,
64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); State v. Curry, 109 N.J. 1, 13-14
(1987); State v. Sugar II, 100 N.J. 214, 241-42 (1985);
State v. Hinton, 333 N.J. Super. 35, 440-42 (App. Div.
2000) (while entry into car to search for credentials
improper, drugs obtained from source independent of