B. When Is a Defendant in Custody?
The requirements of Miranda are only triggered when
the suspect is subject to custodial questioning, defined by
the United States Supreme Court in that opinion as
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.” See also
State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999); State v. P.Z.,
152 N.J. 86 (1997) (“The predicate requirements of
Miranda are that the defendant must be in custody and the
interrogation must be carried out by law enforcement”).
Whether a suspect is or is not in custody at a particular
moment is to be determined by an objective “reasonable
suspect” test,” i.e., whether a reasonable person in the
suspect’s position would believe he was (or was not) in
custody at that moment. Consequently, “[a]n officer’s
subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the
person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the
assessment whether the person is in custody... [A]n
officer’s view’s concerning the nature of an interrogation,
or beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the
individual being questioned, may be among many factors
that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was
in custody, but only if the officer’s views or beliefs were
somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation
and would have affected how a reasonable person in that
position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.”
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994); accord
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (holding that
under federal law, the “ultimate test for determining
custody is simply whether there is a formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest”).
Similarly, our Supreme Court has determined the
“critical determinant of custody” is whether there has been
a significant deprivation of the suspect’s freedom of actions
based on objective circumstances. Those circumstances
include: the time and place of the interrogation, the status
of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such
facts. State v. P.Z.; see also State v. Timmendequas.
Clearly, a suspect must be afforded his or her Miranda
warnings prior to questioning if he has been arrested.
However, mere presence at a police station is not
conclusive in determining whether a suspect is in custody
for purposes of Miranda. A suspect who voluntarily comes
to the police station in response to a police request is
normally not in custody and is therefore not entitled to
Miranda warnings prior to questioning. See California v.
Beheler, 462 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492 (1977); see also State v. Marshall (III), 148 N.J. 89
(1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997); State v.
McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998); State v. Lacaillade, 266 N.J.
Super 522 (App. Div. 1993); State v. Coburn, 221 N.J.
Super. 566 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 300
(1988); State v. Prudden, 212 N.J. Super. 608 (App. Div.
1986); State v. Lutz, 165 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 1979);
but see State v. Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. 123 (App. Div.
1999) (Miranda violation found where homicide suspect
was taken to prosecutor’s office for lengthy questioning,
was not told she was free to leave, and was placed under
arrest immediately following interview); State v. Micheliche,
220 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 40
(1987); State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168 (App. Div.
1974), aff’d o.b. 67 N.J. 267 (1975).When a suspect is questioned outside the coercive
atmosphere of a police station, it is, of course, less likely
that he or she will be found to have been in custody, thereby
triggering the necessity of Miranda warnings. See e.g.,
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); State v.
Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (1999); State v. Graves, 60
N.J. 441 (1972); State v. Keating, 277 N.J. Super. 141 (App.
Div. 1994). Nonetheless, based on the particular
circumstances of a police encounter, a person may indeed
be in custody when questioned at his or her residence or at
a location other than a police station. See Orozco v. Texas,
394 U.S. 324 (1969) (holding that suspect was in custody
when four officers entered his bedroom at 4:00 a.m. and
questioned him at gunpoint); see also State v. O’Loughlin,
270 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1994); State v. Hall, 253
N.J. Super. 84 (Law Div. 1990), aff’d o.b. 253 N.J. Super.
32 (App. Div. 1991).Similarly, a motorist is not in custody if he or she is
subjected to roadside questioning during a routine traffic
stop. Traffic stops are brief, occur in public, and usually
involve only one or two officers. Consequently, the
motorist does not feel “completely at the mercy of the
police.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). The
holding of Berkemer has been interpreted by New Jersey
courts to mean that the police may conduct general on-the-
scene questioning of a suspect, as permitted by Terry v.
Ohio, without providing Miranda warnings. State v.
Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623 (App. Div. 2000); State v.
Toro, 229 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied,
118 N.J. 216 (1989); see also State v. Nemesh, 228 N.J.
Super. 597 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 473
(1989); State v. Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. 62 (App. Div.
1988) (holding that Miranda is not implicated when the
detention and questioning are part of an investigatory
procedure rather than a custodial interrogation).