fleeting” incapacity. The Appellate Division reasoned
that to interpret the statute otherwise would transform
almost all sexual assaults where physical force or coercion
was used to commit an act of sexual penetration into first
degree crimes, a result clearly not intended by the statute.
State v. Pescatore, 213 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div.
1986), aff’d, 105 N.J. 441 (1987). The intent of the
Legislature not to preclude prosecutors from proceeding
against violators of the Sale Tax Act, N.J.S.A. 54:32B-1
et seq., under other applicable laws was made clear by
inclusion of the language “in addition to any other
penalties herein or elsewhere prescribed,” when
addressing penalties to be imposed under the statute.
N.J.S.A. 54:32B-26(b).
State v. Hugley, 198 N.J. Super. 152 (App. Div.
1985). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b(2) does not entitle an
offender to receive credit for time served in another state,
to offset a New Jersey term of imprisonment for a crime
committed before the out-of-state sentence was imposed.
Although criminal statutes should be strictly construed,
the legislature’s intention should not be disregarded.
Reading N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5 in its entirety signifies the
legislature’s intention to give credit only for prior New
Jersey convictions, rather than convictions in other
jurisdictions. Moreover, when the legislature intended
to cover out-of-state convictions in the code, it
specifically did so. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:44-4c. But see
State v. DelaRosa, 327 N.J. Super. 295, 301-02 (App.
Div. 2000)(applying gap-time credits to prisoner serving
sentence in another state.
State v. Carlos, 187 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div.
1982). Under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, a defendant cannot be
convicted of robbery unless the State proves theft or
attempted theft from the victim by force or intimidation.
While acknowledging that N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 signified a
legislative intent to adopt a more expansive concept of
robbery, the court found that the Legislature did not
intend to change the common law larceny (theft)
requirement as an element of robbery.
State v. McGague, 314 N.J. Super. at 263. The de
minimis provision of the code, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-11, which
allows the assignment judge to dismiss a criminal
complaint or indictment, does not apply where the
violation of the law is clear and the violation contravenes
state policy.
B. Meaning of Statutory LanguageState v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156 (1999). Ordinance that
defined term “display” was unambiguous and clearly
applied to transparency displays in defendant’s adult
entertainment stores.State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 (1994). Because the
language of the priest-penitent privilege, Evid. R. 29
(repealed) was ambiguous, the Court reviewed reports of
several Commissions to determine that the privilege
applied only to the cleric. In 1994, the Legislature
enacted N.J.R.E. 511, which makes the privilege
available to both cleric and penitent.State in Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992). The
Court, strictly construing N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1, the sexual
offense statute, concluded that any act of sexual
penetration engaged in by the defendant without the
“affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim” to
the specific act of penetration constitutes the offense of
sexual assault. Any physical force in excess of that
inherent in the act of sexual penetration is not required for
such penetration to be unlawful.State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488 (1987), reviewed the
language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4 (the Breathalyzer refusal
statute) and found it was subject to contradictory
interpretations as to whether actual operation of a motor
vehicle was a necessary element for conviction. Therefore,
the Court went on to examine not only the particular
statute involved, but the entire legislative scheme in
determining legislative intent and ruled that conviction
for refusal did not require the State to prove actual
operation of the vehicle.State v. Rockholt, 96 N.J. 570 (1984). The plain
language of the criminal code changed the prior law
regarding the entrapment defense so as to require both
that the police conduct created a substantial risk that the
crime would be committed by people who were not
predisposed to commit it and that it caused the particular
defendant to commit the crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-12a.
Moreover, the commentary to the code suggested that
the entrapment provision was intended to convert an
otherwise objective entrapment defense into an amalgam
of objective and subjective elements of entrapment.State v. Talley, 94 N.J. 385 (1983). Examining the
language of the code and legislative intent, the Court
determined that a defendant indicted for first degree
robbery could be convicted of theft by deception.
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4. The court emphasized that the code
changed the existing law by consolidating all theft