offenses under the N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2a, so that a
conviction of theft can be supported by any violation of
the substantive theft sections. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1 et seq.
State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220 (1982). The use of a
simulated weapon, as opposed to possession or use of an
actual weapon, was insufficient proof of a deadly weapon
under a pre-1982 definition of deadly weapon to support
a first degree robbery conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:15-
1b. Looking beyond the plain language of the robbery
statute, the Court highlighted the intention of the code’s
drafters to distinguish the use of a simulated weapon for
purposes of second degree robbery and the actual use or
threat to use a dangerous weapon as a requisite element
of first degree robbery. The definition of deadly weapon,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1c, was amended in 1982 to include any
instrument or device which “in the manner it is
fashioned” would lead the victim reasonably to believe it
to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
State v. Hurtado, 219 N.J. 12 (App. Div. 1987), rev’d
on dissent, 113 N.J. 1 (1988). Defendant challenged the
authority of a police officer to arrest an individual for
violating a municipal ordinance. The Appellate Division
noted that the first step in determining the issue was the
statutory provision setting forth a police officer’s
authority. The court also examined the common law of
arrest and the plain meaning of the statutory language
and concluded that there was no limitation on such
arrests. The dissent found no authority for the
warrantless arrest. An officer may arrest for a municipal
ordinance violation without a warrant only for violations
involving a breach of peace. The Supreme Court adopted
the dissenting opinion.
State v. Mieles, 199 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div. 1985),
certif. denied, 101 N.J. 265 (1985). The Appellate
Division held that a spring action BB pistol is a firearm
and a handgun under the penal code and therefore,
sustained convictions for possession of a handgun
without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b, and aggravated
assault by knowingly pointing a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
1b(4).
State v. Monturi, 195 N.J. Super. 317 (Law Div.
1984). Mandatory language should be given its ordinary
meaning absent specific intent to the contrary. Applying
the principle of statutory construction, the court found
that, after a defendant has been convicted of knowing or
purposeful murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c, the State’s proofs
at the penalty stage are limited to evidence related to the
specific aggravating factors the State raised. N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3c(2); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4). Since evidence not
directly related to the aggravating factors might
nonetheless become relevant at the penalty state (i.e. to
help assess the credibility of witnesses testifying at both
the guilt and penalty phases), the court declined to grant
a pretrial motion to try the guilt and penalty phases
before different juries.State v. Garcia, 193 N.J. Super. 334 (App. Div.
1984). An offender is not automatically entitled to bail
on a charge of violation of probation. The plain language
of N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3a(3) gives trial courts the discretion
to hold violators of probation without bail pending
disposition of the charges. Since defendant in this case
committed another offense while still serving a
probationary term, the court properly held him without
bail for violating probation.State v. Roseman, 183 N.J. Super. 137 (App. Div.
1982). The plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59g
and h, mandates that fines imposed on state prison
inmates be collected by the Bureau of Parole and
distributed to the State Treasury. Unless a statute is
ambiguous or uncertain, the plain words control. Since
the statutory language clearly sets forth the procedures
for collecting and distributing funds to be paid by
inmates in state correctional facilities, the court rejected
the claim that Monmouth County should receive the
proceeds.State v. Kiejdan, 181 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div.
1981). Although strict liability generally should not
apply to criminal statutes, the legislature has the
discretion to impose penal consequences, absent a
criminal state of mind, to implement regulatory schemes
dealing with serious social problems. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-
2c(3) (the “gap-filler” provision) does not prohibit penal
strict liability legislation, so long as the legislative body
clearly states its intention to impose strict liability.
Under these standards, the court affirmed defendant
landlord’s conviction for failing to comply with a
township ordinance requiring apartment owners to
furnish heat to tenants at prescribed times.C. Reading Statutes As A Whole, and Intrinsic Aids to
ConstructionState v. Cooper I, 151 N.J. 326 (1997). Legislature
did not intend to create unified crime of murder. Rather,
felony murder is not the moral equivalent of purposeful/
knowing murder.State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563 (1994). Where
statute does not completely convey legislative