State v. Merlino, 216 N.J. Super. 579 (App. Div.
1987). The legislative scheme of the Casino Control Act
demonstrated the intent that the Commission not be
restricted in the same manner as other administrative
agencies. Thus, the “residuum rule,” requiring that
hearsay evidence be supported by competent evidence,
which is applicable to other administrative agencies, is
not applicable to the Commission, and hearsay evidence
was properly admitted at hearings to determine the
propriety of the Commission’s determination to place
“career offenders” on the exclusion list from licensed
gambling casinos.
State v. Johnson, 203 N.J. Super. 436 (Law Div.
1985). A defendant cannot be convicted of operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor (N.J.S.A. 39:4-50) for operating a nonmotorized
pedal bicycle while intoxicated. The unambiguous
definition of motor vehicle set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:1-1
plus the court’s review of other statutory definitions
pertaining to motor vehicle laws clearly indicate that
muscular powered bicycles were not to be included in the
definition of a motor vehicle. But see State v. Tehan, 190
N.J. Super. 348 (Law Div. 1982).
State v. Stern, 197 N.J. Super. 49 (Law Div. 1984).
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6, the State may charge an
indictable offense and then downgrade to a disorderly
persons offense, so long as the original criminal complaint
was filed within the five-year statute of limitations.
D. Extrinsic Aids To Construction
State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112 (1996). A commentary
to a statute cannot overcome clear legislative language.
State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406 (1994). Relying upon
reports of several Commissions, the Court determined
that the priest-penitent privlege in Evid. R. 29 applied
only to the cleric. The Legislature repealed Evid. R. 29
in 1994 and enacted N.J.R.E. 511, which makes the
privilege applicable to both cleric and penitent.
State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471 (1993). Comment from
Executive Branch is helpful in determining legislative
intent. Governor, in invoking conditional veto, made
clear that statute would remove presumption of
concurrent sentences when a person commits a crime
while on bail, probation or parole. Thus, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-5 does not mandate consecutive sentences.
State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14 (1987). After
examining the statutory language and legislative history
of the hindering apprehension statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3,
the Supreme Court concluded that the term “volunteer”
as used in the statute regarding hindering one’s own
apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4), “is sufficiently
ambiguous to preclude its application” to a defendant
who provided a false name to a police officer when asked
his name by the officer. The Court noted that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed and are not to be
extended by implication. The term “volunteer” as used
in the statute was susceptible of more than one
interpretation. The Court, therefore, expanded its
inquiry beyond the plain language of the statute to
determine legislative intent, and determined that the
term “volunteer” did not include information conveyed
in response to police inquiry regarding hindering
another’s apprehension pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
3a(7). Because the Legislature employed the same
language in N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4) as that in N.J.S.A.
2C:29-3a(7) with no clear indication that a different
meaning was intended, the general rule that the same
meaning was intended throughout the statute was
employed by the Court in Valentin.State v. White, 98 N.J. 122 (1984). The Graves Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c, applies to an accomplice convicted of
first degree robbery when one of the perpetrators uses or
possesses a firearm. When the code language is
susceptible of different constructions, it shall be
interpreted to further... the special purposes of the
particular provision involved. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2c. Given
the aim of the Graves Act to deter violent crimes, its
language, the general purposes of the code’s sentencing
procedures and the pre-code treatment of accomplices,
the court determining that the legislature intended to
apply the Graves Act to accomplices convicted of crimes
involving firearms. (See also, SENTENCING, this
Digest).State v. Serrone, 95 N.J. 23 (1983). A life sentence for
a murder conviction is an ordinary sentence under
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, not an extended sentence under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5c. Thus, a
defendant who committed two murders could be
sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. The
legislature’s intent to give specialized treatment to
murder was manifested, in part, by a 1982 amendment
restoring capital punishment and by eliminating any
reference to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 to an extended sentence for
murder. (See also, SENTENCING, this Digest).