L.Ed.2d 484 (1971); State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 346
(App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 163 N.J. 140 (2000).
A suspect may not take advantage of the stringent
requirements for warrantless home arrests by retreating
into a home when the warrantless arrest has been set in
motion in a public place. United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38 (1976); see also, State v. Josey, 290 N.J. Super. 17
(App. Div.) (warrantless arrest and entry proper where
police observed defendant’s sale of cocaine outside and
defendant fled into apartment), certif. denied, 146 N.J.
497 (1996).
When a person is lawfully arrested in his home, the
police have an absolute right to remain with the accused
to monitor his or her movements. See, Washington v.
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5, 102 S.Ct. 3106, 69 L.Ed.2d
969 (1982); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 230 (1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1295, 79 L.Ed.2d
695 (1984). The police, however, may not use an arrest
warrant as an excuse to conduct an exploratory search of
the suspect’s home. See Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 235; State v.
Seiss, 168 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div. 1979). The police
monitoring of the arrested person’s movements must be
conducted in an objectively reasonable fashion. Bruzzese,
94 N.J. at 234. (See also, SEARCH and SEIZURE, this
Digest).
Notwithstanding a valid arrest warrant and lawful
entry into a home by police, the Fourth Amendment is
violated when news reporters, photographers or other
third parties, “who rode along,” enter the defendant’s
home. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 119 S.Ct. 1692,
1699, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999).
The “knock and announce rule” requires police
officers to demand admittance and explain their purpose
prior to breaking into a dwelling for the purpose of
making an arrest. The “knock and announce” rule is a
component of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
inquiry. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S.Ct.
1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995) (police should knock and
announce except under certain circumstances). Three
exceptions to this rule are when: 1) immediate action is
necessary to preserve evidence, 2) the officer’s peril would
be increased, or 3) the arrest would be frustrated. State
v. Jones, 143 N.J. at 4; State v. Love, 233 N.J. Super. 38
(App. Div. 1989), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 188 (1989)
(failure to knock and announce did not invalidate arrest
where evidence could be destroyed).
IX. DETENTION ON LESS THAN PROBABLE CAUSE
A. Stop and Frisk
When a police officer has a reasonable basis to believe
that criminal activity might be afoot and that the
individuals with whom he is dealing might be armed and
presently dangerous, then the officer has the right to stop
defendant and, for protective purposes, to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of defendant
in order to discover any weapon. Although the “frisk” or
“pat down” is a “seizure” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the police officer needs only an
articulable reasonable basis to justify the search. See
Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570
(2000); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. at 458;
State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 278 (1998).In determining whether a police officer has
reasonable cause for a stop and frisk, the “totality of the
circumstances” are considered. United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); State
v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. at 459. The standard to review an
investigatory stop is “if the officer’s observations, in ‘view
of the officer’s experience and knowledge, taken together
with rational inferences drawn from those facts,’ warrant
a ‘limited intrusion upon the individual’s freedom.’”
State v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. at 459 (citation omitted).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, an informant’s
tip may support a finding of good cause to warrant a stop
and frisk. State v. Caldwell, 158 N.J. at 452; State v. Zutic,
155 N.J. 103 (1998); State v. Smith, 155 N.J. at 83. See
also Florida v. J. L., 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254
(2000) (anonymous call alone identifying defendant as
having a gun does not justify stop and frisk of juvenile).
(See also, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, this Digest).B. Motor Vehicle Stop
New Jersey has a compelling interest in maintaining
safe highways with safe drivers. State v. Donis, 157 N.J.
44, 51 (1998). A police officer may stop a motor vehicle
if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that
the driver has committed a motor vehicle offense. State v.
Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999).Except where there is a reasonable articulable
suspicion to believe a motorist is unlicensed or a vehicle
is unregistered or that the vehicle or occupant is otherwise
subject to seizure for violation of the law, the stopping of
an automobile and detaining of the driver to check his