aggravated assault charge been based upon the assault of
a law enforcement officer, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
1b(5), the offenses would not merge because: (1) there
would be no necessity to prove serious bodily injury; and
(2) an additional fact to be proved would be the status of
the victim as a police officer; and (3) the legislative
concern for the status of the police evidences a specific
intent to fractionalize the offense. Assault of a law
enforcement officer contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(5) is
a lesser degree offense than aggravated assault contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1). This distinction also suggests a
different “merger consideration.” State v. Mirault, 92
N.J. 492 (1983).
An officer may exhibit evidence of his authority by
means other than wearing his uniform or presenting his
shield. In State v. DeGrote, 136 N.J. Super. 525, 531-532
(Law Div. 1975), aff’d o.b., 153 N.J. Super. 479 (App.
Div. 1977), the police officer was not in uniform and did
not display his shield. However, testimony revealed that
the officer knew the defendant and was known by the
defendant to be a police officer, and that the officer exited
from a marked police vehicle with its revolving light, was
accompanied by a uniformed officer, and informed the
defendant that he was under arrest. This evidence was
held sufficient to overcome the defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of the State’s case.
See also State v. DeSanto, 172 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div.
1980).
Police officers from other states who pursued suspects
into this State pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform
Law on Fresh Pursuit, N.J.S.A. 2A:155-1 et seq., were
deemed to be law enforcement officers within the
meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:90-4a, the pre-code statute
prohibiting assault upon public officials. This holds true
even though the pursuit may not be legal according to the
Uniform Law, so long as there is no claim of bad faith. In
State v. DeGrote, 136 N.J. Super. at 528-531, two New
York Police officers pursued the defendant into New
Jersey because he was wanted for a New York offense
which, in New Jersey, would constitute a disorderly
person offense. Once the defendant was stopped in New
Jersey, he committed an assault on both officers and was
indicted for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:90-4a. The Court
held that the pursuit into New Jersey was illegal, since the
Uniform Law sanctions such pursuit only in connection
with more serious offenses. Nevertheless, it sustained the
sufficiency of the State’s case, and held that the officers
had acted “in the performance of [their] duties” within
the meaning of the statute.
(6) A person is guilty of second degree aggravated
assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(6), if he causes
bodily injury to another while fleeing or attempting to
elude a law enforcement officer in violation of N.J.S.A.
2C:29-2b (fleeing or attempting to elude any law
enforcement officer after having received a signal from the
officer to bring the vehicle to a full stop) or while
operating a motor vehicle in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
10c (“joyriding”), imposing a strict liability standard.
See State v. Dorko, 298 N.J. Super. 54 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 150 N.J. 28 (1997).This subsection was amended in 1993 to eliminate
the requirement of “serious bodily injury,” which was
substituted with “bodily injury.” See State v. Wallace,
158 N.J. 552 (1999), holding that this subsection, read
in conjunction with N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2 (eluding),
suggests that the Legislature intended both second
degree offenses to require “bodily injury” rather than
“serious bodily injury” and that in eluding cases, the term
“injury” must be defined for the jury.(7) A person is guilty of aggravated assault, contrary
to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(7) if he attempts to cause
significant bodily injury to another or causes significant
bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life recklessly causes such significant
bodily injury.“Significant bodily injury” is defined as bodily injury
which creates a temporary loss of the function of any
bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of
the five senses. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1d.(8) A person is guilty of aggravated assault, contrary
to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(8), if he causes bodily injury by
knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an
explosion in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1 (arson and
related offenses) which results in bodily injury to any
emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression
activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting
from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or
rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire
or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while
responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion.“Emergency services personnel” includes, but is not
limited to, any paid or volunteer fireman, any person
engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and
any law enforcement officer.