A History of India, Third Edition

THE REPUBLIC

Indira Gandhi could, indeed, take pride in having been able to defy both
these powers successfully. Nixon’s policy of threatening an intervention by
sending an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal turned out to be mere
bluff. The Chinese did not even go that far and made no move to support
their Pakistani friends. Indian regional hegemony was firmly established in
this way—but this, of course, increased the sense of insecurity experienced
by smaller neighbouring states. Indira Gandhi had no talent for making
them feel at ease. Even Bangladesh, which she had helped to liberate, soon
showed anti-Indian feelings. Although Indian troops had been quickly
withdrawn, Indian businessmen moved in and the people of Bangladesh
felt that they were exploited by them. The constant quarrel over the
division of the Ganges water contributed to this atmosphere of distrust.
The Farakka barrage was built on Indian territory and was used to divert
water which would have flowed into Bangladesh into the Hugli; the official
reason for this measure was that it prevented the silting up of the port of
Calcutta. Whereas the Indus Water Treaty had settled similar problems in
the west, no solution was found here in the east and the opportunity
offered by the post-liberation atmosphere of amity was missed.
On the other hand, Indira Gandhi did make some progress in
normalising relations with Pakistan when she met Bhutto, who had
emerged as the new leader of that country, in Simla in 1972. Bhutto, who
had earlier missed no opportunity of making scathing attacks against
India—perhaps also because he thought that this would increase his
popularity—was now at the height of his political career and could afford
to be moderate. Moreover, he was a realist who knew that he had to come
to terms with India. He also recognised Bangladesh fairly soon. But
whereas he tried to appear sweet and reasonable, he secretly pursued his
old quest to be on a par with India in terms of power and international
influence. As this could not be achieved by conventional methods he had to
strive for the atomic bomb—particularly as he knew that India was also
keeping its nuclear options open.

The nuclear option and Indo-American relations

In 1974 India surprised the world by exploding a ‘nuclear device’ in an
underground test in the Rajasthan desert. The term ‘bomb’ was carefully
avoided and Indira Gandhi emphasised that India would use this type of
device only for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, India had signalled in
this way that it now belonged to the exclusive club of atomic powers. In
Jawaharlal Nehru’s time the campaign against nuclear tests had been a
major item of India’s foreign policy and India had been one of the first
signatories of the Moscow treaty in 1963 which banned nuclear tests on
the ground or in the atmosphere. In 1964 China had blasted its first
atomic bomb and this made India shy away from signing the Nuclear