Internet of Things Architecture

213

Element to protect Risk D/R/E/A/D rating Examples of Causes Mitigation and relevant Design Choices (for the latter see

Section 5.2.10)

Backend account hacked M/M/L/H/M

enforce medium

security

Not specifically targeted. Addressable through security management and

credentials management policies.

Massive disclosure of

collected data

H/M/L/H/L

enforce medium

security

Not specifically targeted. Addressable through security management

(databases).

Backend service

becoming unavailable

L/M/M/H/L

enforce medium

security

DoS detection / reaction scheme.

DC A.16- 17 : autonomous security

Attacker impersonates

infrastructure services,

compromising IoT

functionalities and/or

other dependent

infrastructure services.

H/M/L/H/M

enforce medium

security

Prevention of impersonation techniques through proper use of

authentication / authorisation procedures (enforced by the respective

Authentication and Authorisation Functional Components (see Section

4.2.2.7)).

DC S.1,3: authentication

Attacker poisons

infrastructure databases

(records corruption /

addition) or alters

outgoing information.

H/H/L/H/M

enforce strong security

Proper authorisation scheme provided by the Authorisation Functional

Component (see Section 4.2.2.7) mitigates this attack. Enforcement of a

trust model (Trust and Reputation Functional Component (see Section

4.2.2.7)) protects against blind acceptation of erroneous data.

DC S.5: service access control. Although this does not allow identifying

corrupted data, it may help identifying and excluding the attacker.

Disclosure of private

services (existence &

description)

L/H/H/M/M

enforce medium

security

Masking the belonging of multiple services to a single entity (unlinkability).

This can be achieved by reliance on pseudonyms provided by the Identity

Management Functional Component (see Section 4.2.2.7).

DC P.1: mitigation through the use of temporary identifiers

Disclosure of access L/H/H/M/M Security management of infrastructure prevents global disclosure of

access policies from the decision point to an unauthorised external