84 Finance & economics The Economist October 30th 2021
F
oreign-exchangemarketswere
once a hotbed of lively, speculative
activity. But today traders seeking an
adrenalin fix must turn to assets like
cryptocurrencies instead. Barring a brief
surge early in the pandemic—and isolat
ed goingson in the Turkish lira—cur
rency markets have gone quiet. Macro
trading funds no longer strike fear into
central bankers and finance ministries
with speculative attacks. The last sudden
end to a major currency peg—that of the
Swiss franc in 2015—was a result of the
central bank taking investors by surprise,
rather than the other way round.
Rockbottom inflation and interest
rates over the past decade helped smoth
er swings in exchange rates. Deutsche
Bank’s cvixindex, a gauge of forex vola
tility, has been above its current level
more than 90% of the time over the past
20 years. By contrast, the vix, which
measures expected volatility for Amer
ica’s s&p500 index of stocks and is often
used as a measure of overall market
sentiment, has so far spent October at
roughly its longterm average. But as
consumer prices and interest rates go up,
currency volatility could well stage a
return, with potentially unwelcome
consequences for some investors.
The strangeness of the recovery from
the pandemic makes predicting the path
of policy especially hard. Yet some di
vergences seem likely to reassert them
selves. Countries are recovering at differ
ent speeds, and central banks are dis
playing varying levels of discomfort with
inflation. Policy in America is especially
important, given the pivotal role of the
dollar: 88% of overthecounter foreign
exchange trades in 2019 involved the
greenback, according to the Bank for
International Settlements. The chances
that the Federal Reserve turns more
rapidly to policy tightening are rising.
Breakevens (the gap between yields on
inflationprotected Treasury bonds and
conventional ones of the same maturity)
point to annual inflation of around 3%
over the next five years, the highest read
ing since at least 2003. By contrast, no one
is expecting interestrate rises for decades
in Japan, where yearonyear inflation,
excluding food and energy, is negative.
Long periods of low volatility are un
derstandably regarded as a good thing by
most investors. But they can have less
desirable sideeffects. Hyman Minsky, an
economist, suggested that periods of
financial stability and sustained profits
can change the behaviour of market par
ticipants, by pushing them to adopt riskier
strategies that could in turn destabilise
markets. The danger is that, as currency
markets return to life, the shortcomings of
these sorts of strategies are exposed.
The boom in Asian economies in the
1990s, which led to enormous unhedged
dollar borrowing by governments and
firms, is a case study in how the percep
tion of safety, once overturned, can cause
violent market reactions. Faced with
steep currency depreciation in 199798,
that borrowing proved impossible to
service, spurring defaults and bailouts.
Today emergingmarket governments
issue far more of their debt in their own
currencies, and when they borrow in
foreign currency, do so at longer maturi
ties. Still, weak spots remain. Dollar
borrowing by nonbanks in the devel
oping world has almost doubled to over
$4trn in the past decade, much of it
reflecting bond issuance by companies,
rather than governments.
Creditors, too, are vulnerable to ex
changerate risk. Working out the extent
to which assetowners hedge their expo
sures is tricky. But the available figures
indicate that falling volatility tends to
cause companies to reduce hedging.
Large Japanese insurers have tended to
hedge more over the past two decades
whenever volatility has risen, suggests
Fed research published last year. Insurers
bought far more currency forwards and
swaps during and immediately after the
global financial crisis, when volatility
peaked, and a declining share relative to
their foreign assets thereafter. Unhedged
net foreign assets in Australia, too, have
risen in the past couple of decades, in
part reflecting the rise of nonbank bor
rowers that are unprotected.
An optimist might point to the mar
ket stress of the early days of the pan
demic, when volatility surged without
causing big currencymarket blowups. If
the system was able to weather acute
distress then, why worry now? But pla
cidity was restored in short order last
year because central banks were unusu
ally coordinated in their easing. Now, by
contrast, they are preparing to go their
separate ways. Currency markets may no
longer be an oasis of calm.
ButtonwoodBack with a vengeance
Why currency volatility could make a comeback
of a minimum corporate tax, repealed un
der President Donald Trump in 2017, was so
onerous that in some years compliance
costs outstripped tax collections.
The gap between taxable income and
book income as reported to shareholders
exists for a reason. When, say, a company
builds a factory, financial rules require it to
spread the cost over many years based on
depreciation, letting investors know the
value of its assets. Tax rules, however, let
firms report costs when incurred. That
lowers tax bills when investments are
made and encourages more spending.
Calculating minimum taxes based on
book, rather than taxable, income would
lead to two perverse outcomes. First, pow
ers over tax would, in effect, be granted to
the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
an unelected body that governs how com
panies report income. Changes in its stan
dards would lead to changes in taxation.
Second, companies would have less
scope for deducting investment expenses,
and hence might pare back capital spend
ing. Mr Biden, though, does not want that
to happen, so the proposal maintains sev
eral deductions, including for spending on
clean energy and on research and develop
ment—one of the provisions that may have
allowed Amazon to lower its taxes.
Companies, for their part, will adapt. By
turning more to debt instead of equity
markets for financing, for instance, they
could increase their interest expenses,
which would eat into both their book and
taxable incomes. The upshot is that the
minimum corporate tax may end up rais
ing far less revenue than its proponents be
lieve, while also skewinginvestment in
centives—and makingamessy tax code
even more complicated. n