The Economist November 20th 2021 Finance & economics 79
Houseprices
Patchup job
H
ousingcostsacrosstherichworldare
rising fast. In America and Australia
prices have increased by nearly 20% in the
past 12 months, and rents too are on the up.
In the past year, prices in New Zealand
have shot up at a pace of more than
NZ$2,000 ($1,400) a week. Costs in big cit
ies have been going up for years, propelled
by a mix of cheap borrowing and a scarcity
of new homes. The pandemic has made
matters worse; lockdowns boosted de
mand for larger homes, while labour and
materials shortages constrained housing
supply. As they try to bring down costs,
governments are throwing all sorts of
ideas at the problem.
One set of policies involves helping
firsttime buyers and renters, while dis
couraging other types of prospective
homeowners. Spain, for instance, wants to
get young people out of their parents’
houses, and is offering them nearly $300 a
month for rent. In South Korea, President
Moon Jaein has brought in more than 20
different regulations, including tighter
lending rules and punitive taxes on expen
sive homes.
Officials elsewhere are focused on de
terring foreign buyers. Justin Trudeau,
Canada’s prime minister, vowed a twoyear
ban on house purchases by nonresidents
during his reelection campaign in August.
New Zealand’s ban on foreigners buying
homes came into force in 2018 after the
controversial purchase of a ranch in the
country by Peter Thiel, a Silicon Valley
heavyweight. Yet although these policies
have successfully put off foreigners, they
have missed the mark on affordability.
House prices in New Zealand have risen
even as purchases by overseas buyers have
dried up. Mr Moon’s efforts have, likewise,
failed to curb steep price rises. Prices of
flats in Seoul have increased by over a third
during his presidency.
That might explain why the focus in
South Korea has shifted to supply. This
year the government unveiled a plan to
build 83,000 homes in the capital. America
has pledged to subsidise construction. Of
ficials in Hong Kong, who blame unafford
able housing for the antigovernment
protests that erupted in 2019, want to ease
costs by building a new city near the terri
tory’s border with mainland China. The de
velopment could house as many as 2.5m
people—a third of Hong Kong’s popula
tion. But Britain’s experience shows just
how difficult expanding housing supply
can be. The government wanted to revamp
planning rules to open up more land to
housebuilding. Then fears of a backlash
from nimby voters and disagreements
within the governing Conservative Party
prompted a rethink.
Faced with the failures of managing de
mand and the political difficulties of ex
panding supply, some governments are
turning instead to a more expedient target:
big landlords. In October Spain’s leftwing
coalition agreed on a housing bill aimed at
cracking down on investment funds. The
new legislation imposes rent controls on
landlords with more than ten properties.
The changes—due to take effect in the sec
ond half of 2022—are a blow for companies
such as Blackstone, a privateequity giant
that is Spain’s biggest landlord.
Spainisonlythelatestcountrytopro
poserestrictionsonlargepropertyinves
tors.Similarapproacheshavesprungupin
IrelandandNewZealand.InAmericaPres
identJoeBidenwantstorestrictthetypes
ofhomes largeinvestors areallowedto
own.Canada’scentralbankersplantoana
lyseinvestors’roleinsurgingprices.Ina
referendum in September Berlin’s resi
dentstookthedrasticstepofvotingtoex
propriate biglandlordssuchasVonovia
andDeutscheWohnen.(Theresultisnon
binding,andlegalsetbacksmeanitmay
neverbecomereality.)
Takingonbiginvestorsmightbepopu
larwithvoters,andeasiertoachievethan
looseningsupplyconstraints.Butwhether
suchanapproachwillleadtomoreafford
able housing is lessclear: curbson big
landlordsmakeitlessprofitabletobuild
newproperties.Ifthecrackdowncontin
ues,investorscouldsimplytaketheirpots
ofcapitalelsewhere,leavinghousingcosts
torisefurtherstill. n
As housing costs rocket, governments
take aim at large investors
Frequent-flyerschemes
Lifting off
W
hen executives at American Air
lines unveiled the world’s first fre
quentflyer programme 40 years ago, they
probably didn’t imagine it would one day
be worth more than the airline itself. Last
year analysts valued the scheme at around
$18bn30bn, eclipsing the company’s cur
rent market capitalisation of $12.9bn. Such
programmes have proved a boon to Ameri
can carriers in the pandemic. Firms in
cluding American Airlines have raised
$30bn in debt backed by the schemes.
Airlines oncehoped simply to foster
loyalty by offering customers freebies. Pas
sengers collected miles as they travelled
and were awarded a free flight once they
racked up enough of them. But schemes to
day are far more sophisticated. Airlines
profit by selling miles to creditcard firms
at a price that exceeds the cost of providing
reward flights and dishing out other perks,
such as hotel stays. They also gain when
miles expire unused or are cashed in for
something of poor value. According to
McKinsey, a consultancy, 1530% of miles
expired unused before the pandemic.
Creditcard issuers in turn use miles to
lure customers with bonuses. Airlineaffil
iated cards tend to rake in much more in
transactions a year than other cards. Many
miles are therefore earned not in the air,
but through card spending on the ground.
That explains why customers earned
$6.8bnworth of miles across big loyalty
schemes in 2020, even as many kept to
their homes. If they were to rush to convert
those miles into free flights as travel takes
off again, the profitability of such schemes
would be jeopardised. But airlines have an
other way to ensure that their programmes
stay profitable: they can deflate the value
of their miles. In the early 2010s American
airlines began to calculate the value of a
mile based on a complex formula of fares
and routes. In 2015 Delta Air Lines stopped
disclosing how the value of its miles was
calculated and embarked on a series of de
valuations, prompting competitors to fol
low. In the past year or so Delta, Southwest
and United have devalued miles on major
routes by 620%.
Airlines have tapped loyalty schemes
for cash before, by selling miles to credit
card firms at discounted rates. United trad
ed its miles with JPMorgan Chase, a bank,
for $600m in the financial crisis. But the
pandemic saw the first use of loyalty pro
grammes as collateral in America, says
N EW YORK
Loyalty programmes have been a
lifeline for airlines
Points mean prizes