lator shall pursue the pleasure of mankind in general? Bentham's own instinctive benevolence
(which his psychological theories prevented him from noticing) concealed the problem from him.
If he had been employed to draw up a code of laws for some country, he would have framed his
proposals in what he conceived to be the public interest, not so as to further his own interests or
(consciously) the interests of his class. But if he had recognized this fact, he would have had to
modify his psychological doctrines. He seems to have thought that, by means of democracy
combined with adequate supervision, legislators could be so controlled that they could only
further their private interests by being useful to the general public. There was in his day not much
material for forming a judgement as to the working of democratic institutions, and his optimism
was therefore perhaps excusable, but in our more disillusioned age it seems somewhat naà ̄ve.
John Stuart Mill, in his Utilitarianism, offers an argument which is so fallacious that it is hard to
understand how he can have thought it valid. He says: Pleasure is the only thing desired; therefore
pleasure is the only thing desirable. He argues that the only things visible are things seen, the only
things audible are things heard, and similarly the only things desirable are things desired. He does
not notice that a thing is "visible" if it can be seen, but "desirable" if it ought to be desired. Thus
"desirable" is a word presupposing an ethical theory; we cannot infer what is desirable from what
is desired.
Again: if each man in fact and inevitably pursues his own pleasure, there is no point in saying he
ought to do something else. Kant urged that "you ought' implies "you can"; conversely, if you
cannot, it is futile to say you ought. If each man must always pursue his own Pleasure, ethics is
reduced to prudence: you may do well to further the interests of others in the hope that they in turn
will further yours. Similarly in politics all co-operation is a matter of log-rolling. From the
premisses of the utilitarians no other conclusion is validly deducible.
There are two distinct questions involved. First, does each man pursue his own happiness?
Second, is the general happiness the right end of human action?
When it is said that each man desires his own happiness, the statement is capable of two
meanings, of which one is a truism and the other is false. Whatever I may happen to desire, I shall
get some