SAINT JOHNRawls does present summary accounts of what utilitarian and perfectionist theories
hold to be competing bases for moral consideration. These bases represent potential alter-
natives to the capacity for having ‘‘a [rational] sense of justice’’ that Rawls will ultimately
hold to be ‘‘necessary and sufficient for the duty of justice to be owed to a person.’’^40 For
utilitarianism, the capacities in question are those ‘‘for pleasure and pain, for joy and
sorrow.’’ Rawls dismisses this variant of moral naturalism with the estimable argument
that it is insufficient to account for the moral indignation we do, in fact, feel at the sight
of injustices perpetrated upon others. It has never been hard to argue against utilitarian-
ism. On the more difficult question of perfectionism, Rawls proceeds as follows:
Such an aristocratic doctrine can only be maintained, I think, if one assumes a spe-
cific obligation on the parties in the original position: namely the obligation to de-
velop human persons of a certain style and aesthetic grace, or the obligation to the
pursuit of knowledge and the cultivation of the arts, or both.I cannot discuss here the
propriety of this assumption, or whether if it were accepted it would justify the inequal-
ities commonly associated with aristocracy.It suffices to saythat in the analytic con-
struction no such obligation is assumed. The sole constraints imposed are those
expressed in the formal elements of the concept of morality, and the only circum-
stances assumed are those exhibiting the conflicts of claims which give rise to ques-
tions of justice.The natural consequence of this constructionis that the capacity for
the sense of justice is the fundamental aspect of moral personality in the theory of
justice.^41That is as far as justification reaches. The point is not to catch Rawls in a dogmatic
preference for a moral universe fueled by one’s susceptibility to guilt, resentment, and
indignation about transgressions of right over an associational universe driven by feelings
such as shame and pride concerning failure or achievement of the good. In fact, Rawls is
more supple on this point than is commonly recognized: he maintains that ‘‘a complete
moral doctrine includes both’’ motivation from shame and motivation from guilt.^42 But
this claim is decisively argued neither here nor elsewhere in his texts; rather, it is continu-
ously deferred. Having excluded the possibility of a purely Kantian appeal to the ‘‘fact of
Reason’’ as the foundation for morality, Rawls employs a rhetorical strategy that invites
us to accept this position on his authority without reason, but clearly without force.
The argument against perfection is, moreover, layered with nuanced shades of feeling,
and these shades of feeling ultimately bear the weight of the argument proper. Rawls’s
commonsensical manner establishes an implicitly antipathetic disposition toward an
‘‘aristocratic ethic which takes as necessary certain attributes and capacities such as
strength, beauty, and superior intelligence’’ precisely by abjuring the qualities of ‘‘imagi-
nation and wit, beauty and grace,’’ that serve as standard criteria of perfectionist virtue.^43
There is a direct relationship between the propositional content of Rawls’s argument,
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