Handbook of Corporate Finance Empirical Corporate Finance Volume 1

194 S. Drucker and M. Puri Rajan (2002)andKanatas and Qi (1998, 2003)examine the implications of some costs and benefits of univ ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 195 of successful capital market financing from choosing an investment bank. Two key im- plicati ...

196 S. Drucker and M. Puri of the evidence from before the enactment of the 1933 Glass–Steagall Act, which pro- hibited commerci ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 197 1990 ).^8 Below, we highlight the formal empirical analyses that explore if the commit- tee’ ...

198 S. Drucker and M. Puri estimate private information as a residual and use its correlation with the second stage dependent va ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 199 for this time period. To compare default performance between ex ante similar bonds, the auth ...

200 S. Drucker and M. Puri difference in the probability of default is approximately the same as the difference in default proba ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 201 and resource firewalls. In 1989, Section 20 affiliates were permitted to underwrite cor- por ...

202 S. Drucker and M. Puri A follow-up paper byRoten and Mullineaux (2002)uses similar methods asGande et al. (1997), but examin ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 203 the returns on six portfolios of stock ranked by size and book-to-market, and the other is t ...

204 S. Drucker and M. Puri securities departments within the bank or as separately incorporated affiliates with their own boards ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 205 lead managed issues during the time period. However,Song (2004)is able to make a related com ...

206 S. Drucker and M. Puri Using a sample of 885 venture-backed IPOs from December 1972 to December 1992, Gompers and Lerner (19 ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 207 Empirical evidence on competition between commercial and investment banks The empirical ev ...

208 S. Drucker and M. Puri fees. A number of studies build on this comparison of fees by focusing directly on the impact of lend ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 209 tionship significantly reduces gross spreads by 18 basis points and concurrent lending where ...

210 S. Drucker and M. Puri could underwrite its securities. They allow the choice of underwriter to depend upon the size of the ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 211 lending around the time of a security issuance increase the probability that an under- write ...

212 S. Drucker and M. Puri 5.1. Japan Japan and the United States have similar regulatory histories regarding the ability of com ...

Ch. 5: Banks in Capital Markets 213 yields,Hamao and Hoshi (2002)find weak evidence for conflicts of interest,Takaoka and McKenz ...