Handbook of Corporate Finance Empirical Corporate Finance Volume 1

54 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala Virtually all studies routinely match on size, industry, the book-to-market ratio, and so on. The “tr ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 55 ing identical treatment probabilities (or propensity scores). Averaging acr ...

56 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala Panel data with fixed effects In self-selection models, the central issue is that unobserved attrib ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 57 Bayesian self-selection models Thus far, our discussion covered inference ...

58 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala 6.2. Bayesian methods for selection models To illustrate the implementation of the Bayesian approach ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 59 II. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS This part reviews empirical applications of self ...

60 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala EorNE, markets update expectations. If the private information affects stock prices, the stock price ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 61 decisions is E(ARsdi)=γsd+βdE(ψdi|C, S)+βsE(ψsi|C, S). (36) The question of ...

62 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala 7.3. Takeovers:Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990) Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990)—henceforth ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 63 Michalsen (1997)use it to explain why rights flotations are not favored ove ...

64 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala The pricing of public debt offerings Companies making a debt issue must make several decisions rela ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 65 the conflicts of interest hypothesis predicts the morepositivecoefficient.^ ...

66 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala if a pure investment bank syndicate is chosen. Thus, a hybrid syndicate is observed (regime 1) whenAi ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 67 i.i.d. for the purposes of estimation. As Song points out, additional data ...

68 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala their debt issues. This incentive is recognized and priced by the market, and the pricing differentia ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 69 of self-selection in explaining this choice, and in particular, whether fir ...

70 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala 9.2. Analyst coverage:Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006) Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006)ex ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 71 coverage—might affect the probability of winning an underwriting mandate. A ...

72 K. Li and N.R. Prabhala the diversification discount. If not, the diversification discount could not be due to di- versificat ...

Ch. 2: Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance 73 10.2. Observables and the discount:Villalonga (2004) WhileCampa and Kedia ( ...