Atheism and Theism 7362 Jonathan Barnes, The Ontological Argument, p. 57.
63 Compare W.V. Quine, Word and Object. Compare also some of the papers by
Donald Davidson, such as ‘On Saying That’, in which Davidson embarks on
the project of showing that the underlying structure of intensional sentences is
indeed that of classical first order logic. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth
and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
64 See Gilbert Harman, ‘ The Inference to the Best Explanation’,Philosophical
Review, 74, 88–95, and Gilbert Harman, Thought(Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1975). For a recent treatment see Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best
Explanation(London: Routledge, 1991).
65 Summa Theologica, I, qa. 2, art. 3.
66 See Bertrand Russell and F.C. Copleston, ‘A Debate on the Existence of
God’, originally broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation, 1948, and
included in John Hick (ed.), The Existence of God (New York: Macmillan, 1964).
67 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time.
68 E.P. Tryon, ‘Is the Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?’,Nature, 246 (1973),
396 –7.
69 See C.B. Martin, Religious Belief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 156.
70 See W.V. Quine, ‘Necessary Truth’, in his Ways of Paradox and Other Essays
(New York: Random House, 1966).
71 To prevent misunderstanding I should make it clear here I count socalled ‘higher
order logic’ as ‘set theory’. Quine has called it ‘set theory in sheep’s clothing’,
Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 66–8.
Whether it be called ‘logic’ or not the point I make about set theory applies
to it, once allowance is made for the ‘sheep’s clothing’. Quine calls first order
logic simply ‘quantification theory’.
72 Especially to pure mathematicians. See G.H. Hardy, ‘Mathematical Proof ’,
Mind, 38 (1929).
73 Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind (London: Vintage, 1989).
74 Hartry Field, Science without Numbers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) and Realism,
Mathematics and Modality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
75 David Lewis, Parts of Classes (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
76 ‘ To Be is to be the Value of a Variable (or to be Some Value of Some Variables)’,
Journal of Philosophy, 81 (1984), 430 – 49.
77 D.M. Armstrong has pioneered such an empirically based theory of universals.
See for example his Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Boulder, Colorado
and London: Westview Press, 1991).
78 Peter Forrest and D.M. Armstrong, ‘The Nature of Number’,Philosophical
Papers, 16 (1987), 165 – 86.
79 John Bigelow, The Reality of Number: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
80 William Kneale, ‘ Time and Eternity in Theology’,Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 61 (1960 – 1), 87 – 108, and Martha Kneale, ‘Eternity and Sempiter-
nity’, ibid., 69 (1968 – 9), 223 – 38. The Kneales come down on the side of
sempiternity.