Aristotle on divine movement and human nature 241
mor. 2. 8 is that in the latter chapter Aristotle (or the Peripatetic author of
theMagna moralia) seems to be satisfied with these impulses as the cause
ofeutuchia, whereas inEth. Eud. 8. 2 Aristotle proceeds to a search for the
cause of these impulses themselves.^12
In his discussion of divination inOn Divination in Sleep, Aristotle uses
the distribution argument three times in order to combat the traditional
view that dreams are sent by a god:^13 in each case the wording is strikingly
similar toEth. Eud. 1247 a 28 – 9 :
462 b 20 – 2 : For that the sender [of such prophetic dreams] were a god is irrational
in many respects, and it is particularly paradoxical that he sends them not to the
best and the most intelligent of people but to ordinary people.^14
463 b 15 – 18 : For it is quite simple-minded people that tend to foresee the future
and to have clear dream images, which suggests that it is not a god that sends
them but rather that all those people whose nature is, so to speak, melancholic and
garrulous see all kinds of dream visions.^15
464 a 19 – 20 : And for this reason, this experience [i.e. foreseeing the future in sleep]
occurs in ordinary people and not the most intelligent. For it would happen during
the daytime and in intelligent people, if it were a god who sent it.^16
Moreover, it is remarkable that in 463 b 18 ‘the melancholics’ are mentioned
as an example of the fact that ‘quite simple-minded people tend to foresee
the future and have clear dreams’ (
( !
), which
is for Aristotle a sign that dreams cannot be sent by a god. This is barely,
if at all, compatible withEth. Eud. 1248 a 39 – 40 , where he says that ‘this is
why the melancholics have clear dream images’ (
3 /
( !
), and where the causal connection marked by ‘this is why’ (
3)
is with the assertion that God ( !) foresees the future, and that God
(^12) See Dirlmeier ( 1958 ) 421. I am aware that the authorship of theMagna moraliastill is, and probably
always will be, a matter of dispute, but the arguments in favour of an Aristotelian origin of much of
the philosophical contents, at least, are so strong that I have thought it desirable to includeMag. mor.
2. 8 in my discussion (see ch. 5 above, n. 42 ). I have refrained from an explanation of the discrepancy
betweenEth. Eud. 8. 2 andMag. mor. 2. 8 concerning the cause of the ‘impulses’, and from a discussion
of the implications of this discrepancy, should it be an inconsistency, for the dating and authorship
of this part of theMagna moralia.
(^13463) b 13 : ! ( J A# 1 -
. On the wider context of these three passages see ch. 6
above.
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