in decline, the Anglo-American elite decided in favor of a geopolitical alliance with China against
the Soviets for the foreseeable future. This meant that the honor of Uhad to be dumped overboard as so much useless ballast, whatever the domestic politicalS committments to the ROC
consequences might be. This was the task given to Kissinger, Nixon, and George Bush.
The maneuver on the agenda for 1971 was to oust the ROC from the UN Security and assign their
seat there to Peking. Kissinger and Nixon calculated that duplicity would insulate them fromdomestic political damage: while they were opening to Peking, they would call for a "two Chinas" (^)
policy, under which both Peking and Taipei would be represented at the UN, at least in the General
Assembly, despite the fact that this was an alternative that both Chinese governments vehemently
rejected. The US would pretend to be fighting to keep Taipei in the UN, with George Bush leading
the fake charge, but this effort would be defeated. Then the Nixon Administration could claim thatthe vote in the UN was beyond its control, comfortably resign itself to Peking in the Security
Council, and pursue the China card. What was called for was a cynical, duplicitious diplomatic
charade in which Bush would have the leading part.
This scenario was complicated by the rivalry between Secretary of State Rogers and NSC bossKissinger. Rogers was an old friend of Nixon, but it was of course Kissinger who made foreign (^)
policy for Nixon and the rest of the government, and Kissinger who was incomparably the greater
evil. Between Rogers and Kissinger, Bush was unhesitatingly on the side of Kissinger. In later
Congressional testimony Ray Cline, a wheelhorse of the Bush faction of the CIA, has tried to argue
that Rogers and Bush were kept in the dark by Nixon and Kissinger about the real nature of the USChina policy. The implication is that Bush's efforts to keep Taiwan at the UN were in good faith.
According to Cline's fantastic account, "Nixon and Kissinger actually 'undermined' the department's
efforts in 1971 to save Taiwan." [fn 10] Rogers may have believed that helping Taiwan was US
policy, but Bush did not. Cline's version of these events is an insult to the intelligence of any serious
person.
The Nixon era China card took shape during July, 1971 with Kissinger's "Operation Marco Polo I,"
his secret first trip to Peking. Kissinger says in his memoirs that Bush was considered a candidate to
make this journey, along with David Bruce, Elloit Richardson, Nelson Rockefeller, and Al Haig. [fn
11] Kissinger first journeyed to India, and then to Pakistan. From there, with the help of YahyaKhan, Kissinger went on to Beijing for meetings with Chou En-Lai and other Chinese officals. He (^)
returned by way of Paris, where he met with North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho at the Paris
talks on Indo-China. Returning to Washington, Kissinger briefed Nixon on his understanding with
Chou. On July 15, 1971 Nixon announced to a huge telvision and radio audience that he had
accepted "with pleasure" an invitation to visit China at some occasion before May of 1972. Hlamely assured "old friends" (meaning Chiang Kai-Shek and the ROC government on Taiwan) thate (^)
their interests would not be sacrificed. Later in he same year, between October 16th and 26th,
Kissinger undertook operation "Polo II," a second, public visit with Chou in Peking to decide the
details of Nixon's visit and hammer out what was to become the US-PRC Shanghai Communique',
the joint statement issued during Nixon's stay. During this visit Chou cdisoriented by the hostile Peking propaganda line against the US, manifestations of which wereautioned Kissinger not to be
everywhere to be seen. Anti-US slogans on the walls, said Chou, were meaningless, like "firing an
empty cannon." Nixon and Kissinger eventually journeyed to Peking in February, 1972.
It was before this backdrop that Bush waged his farcical campaign to keep Taiwan in the UN. TheState Department had stated through the mouth of Rogers on August 2 that the US would support
the admission of Red China to the UN, but would oppose the expulsion of Taiwan. This was the so-
called "two Chinas" policy. In an August 12 interview, Bush told the Washington Post that he was
working hard to line up the votes to keep Taiwan as a UN member when the time to vote came in
the fall. Responding to the obvious impression that this was a fraud for domestic political purposes