One of Bush's friends did not desert him. When Bush came to Houston on Arally, he was introduced by former Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski, a man devoted topril 28 for a lunchhour
his cause. Jaworski condemned Reagan as an "extremist whose over-the-counter simplistic
remedies and shopworn platitudes of solutions trouble open-minded and informed voters." Jaworski
assailed Carter as a "Democrat in despair," and called on the Texas voters "to pay no attention to the
also-rans who marched to the altar of publand who are now back home licking their wounds as rejected suitors." This was a veiled attack onic opinion, wooing the voters with large campaign chests
Connally, who had spent $12 million getting one Arkansas delegate, dropped out, and endorsed
Reagan. Jaworski's Watergate-era loyalties ran deep. [fn 24]
Bush still claimed that Texas was his home state, so he was obliged to make an effort there inadvance of the May 3 primary. Here Bush spent about half a million dollars on television, while the (^)
Reaganauts were unable to buy time owing to their lack of money; Reagan had now reached his
FEC spending ceiling. The secret society issue was as big in Texas as it had been in New
Hampshire; during an appearance at the University of Texas Bush delivered a whining ultimatum to
Reagan to order his campaign workers to "stop passing out insidious literature" questioning Bush'spatriotism because of his membership in the Trilateral Commission, which Bush characterized as a (^)
group that sought to improve US relations with our closest allies. He wanted Reagan to repudiate
thie entire line of attack, which was still hurting the Bushmen badly. During a five-day plane-
hopping blitz of the state, Bush came across as "cryptically hawkish".
Despite the lack of money for television, Reagan defeated Bush by 52% to 47% of the half a million
votes cast. But because of the winner-take-all rule in individual precincts, Reagan took 61 delegates
to Bush's 19. Bush's only areas of strength were in his old Houston liberal Republican enclave and
in northwest Dallas. Reagan swept the rest, especially the rural areas. [fn 25 ]
The issue became acute among the Bushmen on May 20. This was the day Bush won in Michigan,
but that Bush win was irrelevant because Reagan, by winning the Nebraska primary the same day,
had acquired enough pledged delegates to acquire the arithmetical certainty of being nominated on
the first ballot. In the tradition of Dink Stover at Yale, which says that one must not be a quitter,
Bush made some noises about going on to Ohio and to California on the outside chance that Reaganmight self-destruct through some horrendous gaffe, but this was merely histrionics. Bush allowed
himself to be convinced that discretion was the better part of valor by David Keene and
speechwriter (and later red Studebaker biographer) Vic Gold. His campaign was now $400,000 in
debt, but Mosbacher later claimed to have wiped that slate clean within two months. Bush officially
capitulated on May 26, 1980, aReagan, campaigning that day at the San Bernardino Countnd declared that he would support Reagan all the way to November.y Fairgrounds, commended Bush's
campaign and thanked him for his support.
All the money and organization had not sufficed. Bush now turned his entire attention to the quest
for his "birthright," the vice presidency. This would be his fifth attempt to attain that office, andonce again, despite the power of Bush's network, success was uncertain.
Inside the Reagan camp, one of Bush's greatest assets would be William Casey, who had been
closely associated with the late Prescott Bush. Casey was to be Reagan's campaign manager for the
1980 elections. In 1962, PStrategy Information Center in New York City, a forum where Wall Street lawyers like Casey couldrescott and Casey had co-founded a think tank called the National (^)
join hands with politicians from Prescott's wing of the Republican Party, financiers, and the
intelligence community. The National Strategy Information Center provided material for a news
agency called Forum World Features, a CIA proprietary that operated in London, and which was in
liaison with the British Information Research Department, a cold-war propaganda unit set up by