As the convention came closer, Reagan continued to be houndeoutside his own campaign. A few days before the convention it began to dawn on Red by Bushmen from inside andagan that one (^)
alternative to the unpalatable Bush might be former President Gerald Ford, assuming the latter
could be convinced to make the run. Two days before Reagan left for Detroit, according to one of
his strategists, Reagan "came to the conclusion that it would be Bush, but he wasn't all that happy
about it." [fn 29] But this was not yet the last word.
Casey, Meese, and Deaver sounded out Ford, who was reluctant but did not issue a categorical
rejection. Stuart Spencer, Ford's 1976 campaign manager, reported to Reagan on his contacts with
Ford. ''Ron,' Spencer said, 'Ford ain't gonna do it, and you're gonna pick Bush.' But judging from
Reagan's reaction, Spencer recalled later, "There was no way he was going to pick Bush,'and thereason was simple: Reagan just didn't like the guy. "It was chemistry,' Spencer said. [fn 30]
Reagan now had to be ground down by an assortment of Eastern Liberal Establishment perception-
mongers and political heavies. Much of the well-known process of negotiation between Reagan and
Ford for twhile eating up the clock until the point was reached when Reagan would have no choice but tohe "Dream Ticket" of 1980 was simply a charade to disorient and demoralize Reagan (^)
make the classic phone call to Bush. It is obvious that Reagan offered the Vice Presidency to Ford,
and that the latter refused to accept it outright, but engaged in a process of negotiations ostensibly in
order to establish the conditions under which he might, eventually, accept. [ fn 31] Casey called in
Henry Kissinger and asked him to intercede with Ford. What then developed was a marathon ofhaggling in which Ford was represented by Kissinger, Alan Greenspan, Jack Marsh, and Bob
Barrett. Reagan was represented by Casey, Meese, and perception-monger Richard Wirthlin. Dick
Cheney, Ford's former chief of staff and now Bush's pro-genocide Secretary of Defense, also got
into the act.
The strategy of Bush and Casey was to draw out the talks, running out the clock until Reagan would
be forced to pick someone. Inside the negotiations, the Ford camp made demand after demand.
Would Ford have a voice on foreign policy and defense? Would he be a member of the cabinet?
Would he become the White House chief of staff? At the same time, leaks were made to the press
about the negotiations and how sweeping constitutional issues were being haggled over in a classicsmoke-filled room. These leaks became more and more embarrassing, making it easy to convince
Reagan that his imnage was being tarnished, that he ought to call off the talks and pick Bush.
This complex strategy of intrigue culminated in Ford's notorious interview with Walter Cronkite, in
which the CBS anchor man asked Ford if "It's got to be something like a co-presidency?" "That'ssomething Governor Reagan really ought to consider," replied Ford, which was not what a serious (^)
vice presidential candidate might say, but did correspond rather well to what "Jerry the Jerk" would
say if he wanted to embarass Reagan and help Bush. As for Cronkite, was it possible that his
coining of the term "co-presidency" was stimulated by someone from Prescott Bush's old circles at
CBS?
Bombarded by the media now with the "co-president" thesis, Reagan began to see foreshadowings
of a public relations debacle. Television reporters began to hype an imminent visit by Reagan and
Ford to the convention to present the "Dream Ticket." Meese was despatched to Kissinger to
demand a straight answer from the Ford camp. "Kissinger told Meese that the Ford side might notbe able to have an answer until the next morning, if then, because there were still many questions
about how the arrangement might work." Reagan called Ford and asked for a prompt decision.
Reagan aide Lyn Nofziger concluded at this point: "Hey, we don't think this is going to work, and
these guys are kind of stalling for time here." Nofziger suspected that Ford was trying to back
frankie
(Frankie)
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