secret councils was merely dissembling to prevent his staffs from opposing that decision. Making a
strategic decision of such collossal implications on the basis of a psycho-manipulative pep talk fromThatcher suggests that Bush's hyperthyroid condition was already operating; the hyperthyroid
patient notoriously tends to resolve complicated and far-reaching alternatives with quick, snap
decisions. Several published accounts have sought to argue that the decision for large-scale
intervention did not come until Saturday at Camp David, but these accounts belong to the "red
Studebaker" school of coverup. The truth is that Bush went to war as the racist tail on the Britishimperial kite, cheered on by the Kissinger cabal that permeated and dominated his administration. (^)
As the London Daily Telegraph gloated, Mrs. Thatcher had "stiffened [Bush's] resolve."
Bush had been scheduled to stay overnight in Aspen, but he now departed immediately for
Washington. Later, the White House said that Bush had been on the phone with Saudi King Fahd,who had agreed that the Iraqi invasion was "absolutely unacceptable." [fn 35] On the return trip and (^)
through the evening, the Kissingerian operative Scowcroft continued to to press for military
intervention, playing down the difficulties which other avdisers had been citing. Given Kissinger's
long-standing relationship with London and the Foreign Office, it was no surprise that Scowcroft
was fully on the London line.
Before the day was out, "the orders started flooding out of the Oval Office. The president had all of
these diplomatic pieces in his head. The UN piece. The NATO piece. The Middle east piece. He
was meticulous, methodical, and personal," according to one official. [fn 36]
The next morning was Friday, August 3, and Bush called another NSC meeting at the White House.
The establishment media like the New York Times were full of accounts of how Iraq was allegedly
massing troops along the southern border of Kuwait, about to pounce on Saudi Arabia. Scowcroft,
with Bush's approval, bludgeoned the doubters into a discussion of war options. Bush ordered the
CIA to prepare a plan to overthrow or assassinate Saddam Hussein, and told Cheney, Powell, andGen. Schwarzkopf to prepare military options for the next day. Bush was opening the door to war (^)
slowly, so as to keep all of his civilian and military advisers on board. Later on Friday, Prince
Bandar, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington, met with Bush. According to one version,
Bush pledged his word of honor to Bandar that he would "see this through with you." Bandar was
widely reputed to be working for the CIA and other western intelligence agencies. There were alsoreports that he had Ethiopian servants in the Saudi embassy in Washington, near the Kennedy
Center, who were chattel slaves according to United Nations definitions.
When the time came in the afternoon to walk to his helicopter on the White House south lawn for
the short flight to the Camp David retreat in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland, Bush stopped atthe microphones that were set up there, a procedure that became a habit during the Gulf crisis.
There was something about these moments of entering and leaving the White House that heightened
Bush's psychological instability; the leaving and arriving rituals would often be the moments of
some of his worst public tantrums. At this point Bush was psyching himself up towards the fit that
he would act out on his Sunday afternoon rebellicosity was rising by the hour. With Kuwait under occupation, he said, "the status quo isturn. But there was already no doubt that Bush's
unacceptable and further expansion" by Iraq "would be even more unacceptable." This formulation
already pointed to an advance into Kuwait. He also stressed Saud Arabia: "If they ask for specific
help-- it depends obviously on what it is-- I would be inclined to help in any way we possibly can."
[fn 37]
On Saturday morning, August 4, Bush met with his entourage in Camp David, present Quayle,
Cheney, Sununu, William Webster, Wolfowitz, Baker, Scowcroft, Powell, Schwarzkopf, Fitzwater,
and Richard Haas of the NSC staff. Military advisers, especially Colin Powell, appear to have
directed Bush's attention to the many problems associated with military intervention. According to