Foundations Shaken but Not Stirred 99Gallie postulates four major initial characteristics of such concepts. They must be
appraisive ‘in the sense that it signifies or accredit some kind of valued achievement’;
second, the achievement ‘must be of an internally complex character’; third, it follows
that any description of the concept, of necessity, involves a number of rival accounts;
fourth, that parties who are interested in the concept recognized that the concept
can be modified. In other words, there is a recognition of the ‘open’ character of
the concept. In addition to these four ‘more important’ characteristics to essentially
contested concepts, Gallie postulates further aspects. Thus, he contends, fifth, that all
parties ‘recognize the fact that its own use of it is contested by those of other parties’.
The concept can be used against other uses both defensively or aggressively (Gallie
1955–6: 171–2). He also contends that there must be some form of original ‘examplar’
or prototype, whose authority is recognized in some way by all the contestants. Thus,
‘to follow an examplar is to exert oneself to revive its (or his) way of doing things’
(Gallie 1955–6: 177). Although, he adds, there is no way of ascertaining who actually
does have the most correct revival. In other words, there is no way of absolutely
attaining a ‘best use’. Finally, he contends that the concept and its achievements
could not have developed in the way they have ‘except by the kind of continuous
competition’ (Gallie 1955–6: 178).
Some critics would say that reason demands ‘universal assent’ and essential con-
testability appears to undermine this. Gallie replies that this may be necessary in the
natural sciences, ‘but it fails completely as a description of those elements of reason
that make possiblediscussionsof religious, political and artistic problems’ (Gallie
1955–6: 196). This is emphatically not an argument concerning irrationality. Further,
for Gallie, the critic might say that he is confusing logical use or proper use of the
concept now and its historical conditions. He contends that the two can be linked
at any time. Any appraisal of a concept must include ‘not simply consideration of
different uses...as we use it to-day, but consideration of such instances as display its
growth and development’ (Gallie 1955–6: 197–8). For Gallie, even if this is a ‘form’
of historicism, it is not fallacious, but, is a necessary component of the analysis of
any concept.
It is important to note here that essential contestability is distinct from simple con-
testedness, in terms of historically or sociologically different meanings. Thus, Gallie’s
thesis, as he asserts it above, isnotsimply about historicism, sociological relativism,
or meaning variance and shift. Further, it is also distinct from the thesis that the
criteria of the application of a concept may be in dispute, but the protagonists do
not deny that some form of resolution is possible or desirable, and that it would be
definite progress if it could be resolved. Essential contestability is a far stronger philo-
sophical perspective, which asserts that disputes about certain concepts are actually
endless. There will always be good reasons to continue disputation and there is no
definite way to resolve these disputes. This invokes a strong incommensurability thesis
and a deeply-sceptical demeanour. In this sense, it appears to be most faithful to its
Wittgensteinian roots.
A number of theorists have applied essential contestability as the favoured method
for political theory with variable success.^12 It remained (with variations of ordin-
ary language theory), an undercurrent on many courses on Anglophone conceptual