Bleached Foundations 119non-coercive capacity for ‘reconciliation of individual interests with mutual benefit’
(Gauthier 1986: 14), which is essentially Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ argument.
Every human being has the desire for ‘indefinite appropriation, seeking to subdue
more and more of the world to his power’. This fact, for Gauthier, ‘runs deeper than
our disavowals’ (Gauthier 1986: 316). Yet, Western civil societies have discovered the
secret of how to harness the ‘efforts of the individual working for his own good, in
the cause of ever increasing benefit’ (Gauthier 1986: 17).
Gauthier’s view of justice is therefore essentially a hypothetical social contract
account, reliant upon the foundational assumptions of methodological individualism
and instrumental economic rationality. Justice provides devices to enable egoists to
get along. Principles of justice are the result of instrumentally rational self-constraint.
Justice and instrumental reason essentially coincide in cooperative interaction with
each pursuing their own interests. Voluntary compliance, in fact, eliminates much
of the need for social institutions and their costs. Basically, individual self-interested
agents mutually agree to cooperate, since it is to theirmutualadvantage. All indi-
viduals are viewed equally as maximizers of their own interests. Gauthier’s starting
point for bargaining here is regarded as pure. The prisoner’s dilemma lies behind the
theory, namely, participants can either cooperate or defect, yet, it is better for all, if all
cooperate, rather than if all defect. As Gauthier comments ‘in Dilemma-structured
situations, each maximizer will confront the uncomfortable truth that the outcome
of the apparently rational, maximizing behaviour of herself and every other person,
leaves her, and indeed each person, worse off than need be, given where it leaves the
others’ (Gauthier 1986: 176). In consequence, individuals are constrained to facilitate
mutually-advantageous outcomes. The rational self-interested agent grasps the force
of moral claims in overcoming the problems of the prisoner’s dilemma. However,
individuals, when they bargain, are, as Gauthier puts it, ‘non-tuist’. Non-tuist means,
taking no interest in those with whom they interact and exchange. Tuism implies a
concern or interest in others. Gauthier notes that ‘The demand for justice is...prior
to any particular tuistic concerns’ (Gauthier 1986: 220). Motivation is always purely
individual and egoistic.
Yet only bargains which derive from a relatively fair initial position—in accord-
ance with what Gauthier calls ‘minimax relative concession’—will be acceptable
to all agents. Minimax relative concession reflects the practice of bargaining itself.
Rational egoists basically always try to minimize concessions to other bargainers.
Equal concessions are rational, assuming both agents are equally rational. Mimimax
relative concession is therefore both a ground for rational individual bargaining and
an impartial constraint on each person’s behaviour. As Gauthier comments, ‘The
just person is disposed to comply with the requirement of the principle of minimax
relative concession in interacting with those of his fellows whom he believes to be
similarly disposed. The just person is fit for society because he has internalized the
idea of mutual benefit’ (Gauthier 1986: 157). Thus, individual attempts to maximize
interests will always be a form of constrained maximization. Whereas Hobbes’ solu-
tion to the prisoner’s dilemma is the terror of the sovereign, Gauthier’s is constrained
maximization, a constraint that is internal to will and rational choice. Gauthier