134 The Nature of Political TheoryIf, however, one asks a basic question, ‘what is liberalism?’, then issues become
less clear. There have been many typologies of liberalism. As indicated earlier, a
simplerdistinctionwouldbebetweenclassicalandsocialliberalism. Theclassicalview,
which is a predominantly procedural view in its modern guise, insists that individual
rights must always come first and must take precedence over collective goals.^27 This
perspective also covers the ‘justice as mutual advantage’ arguments. Michael Walzer
characterizes this procedural liberalism as ‘committed in the strongest possible way
to individual rights and, almost as a deduction from this, to a rigorously neutral state,
that is, a state without cultural or religious projects or, indeed, any sorts of collective
goals beyond personal freedom and physical security’ (Walzer in Gutman (ed.) 1994:
99). Yet, this is also a view that one finds, according to Charles Taylor, in writers such
as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman.^28 This conception of liberal
society has no substantive view about the ends of human life. Society is rather united
behind an idea of formally equal respect for individuals. For Taylor, the roots to this
procedural view are culturally very deep. He sees Kant as probably the single most
important figure articulating this perspective. Human dignity focuses on autonomy
and the ability of the individual to determine their own notion of the good life.
Thus, procedural liberalism enshrines a politics of equal respect which is hostile or
indifferent to difference, because it insists on the uniform application of rights and is
thus suspicious of any collective goals. Taylor has his own thoughts on the problems
that this notion of liberalism has caused in the Canadian situation, vis á vis Quebec.
Social liberal thought, on the other hand, was more committed to collective welfare
goals, pursued through the state. Essentially social liberals reacted to certain themes
present within classical liberalism, notions like atomized individualism, the negative
conception of liberty, the radically free market economy, and minimal constitu-
tional state theory. They wished to replace these with a socialized and developmental
understanding of the individual; a ‘positively inclined’ conception of liberty, linked
to notions like self-realization and self-development; a conception of a mixed eco-
nomy; and a more responsive, collectivized, and ethical conception of the state. State
intervention was generally premised upon the idea of the common good and the real-
ization of human personalities.^29 The social liberals were, in effect, developing the
embryonic form of the welfare state theory. Their arguments were rooted in forms of
evolutionary theory, social utilitarianism, and philosophical idealism.
One problem here is knowing where to place rationalist contractarians such as
Rawls and Barry? Barry (possibly Rawls also) would not be comfortable being classed
as a classical liberal ideologist. Yet, despite Taylor’s’ classification, the distributive
policy implications of the impartiality argument makes it more appropriate for the
social liberal category. The key point to draw out from this distinction between
classical and social liberalism is that, such arguments move quite directly into the
ideological sphere and become subject to a great deal more of political play and
contingency. Once one observes theories of justice squabbling over public policy (as
happened during the 1980s and 1990s), then the vigorously asserted philosophical
patina begins to look flakier and less convincing. What seems to be taking place is an
ideological dispute. In fact, given that there is no clear resolution in sight concerning