New Conventions for Old 191The heart of republicanism is this conception of the ‘public thing’. The ‘public thing’
is valuable in terms of what it either embodies or facilitates. This idea of the ‘public
thing’ is neither opposed to nationalism, because of its ‘particularist’ ontology, nor
because of its conventionalist emphasis, but, rather, because the nation isnotacon-
ventional structure worthy of moral respect. Republicanism therefore remains firmly
conventionalist in ontological texture, but it objects to the value structure and char-
acter of nationalism in practice. It is worth underscoring another important point
here. The ‘public thing’ is primarily related to the particular state. This is not just
any state, but, conversely the conventional, somewhat rare and fragile structure of a
republican state. The only way a more universal republican order could prevail is from
the ‘bottom up’, that is, where states become republican. In this sense, republicanism,
in itself, is yet another conventionalist alternative to liberal universalism. Just how
conventionalist republicanism is, is a matter of how one reads the substantive values
of the ‘public thing’.
What, in this context, is the ‘public thing’ and what precisely is valuable within
it? It is difficult to generalize here, however, it is possible to gain the gist of what
drives contemporary republicans by considering what moral and political values are
promoted within, or by, this ‘public thing’. The important point, for both Skinner
and Pettit, is that the ‘public thing’ embodies a particular conception of the rela-
tionship between law and liberty.^16 This argument is also a way of differentiating
procedural liberalism from republicanism. Basically liberals are seen to mistakenly
view law as a permanent (if necessary) affront to all liberty. Some commentators
have consequently referred to the liberal conception of law and liberty as quantit-
ative, that is, the more law entails the less liberty.^17 In republican theory a more
qualitative conception is adopted, such that law is not necessarily a restraint on
liberty, conversely it protects it. Thus, for Skinner and others, the republican tra-
dition, stemming from Machiavelli, sees lawpreservingliberty. If citizens are to
enjoy any kind of freedom, to pursue their own ends they must live in a state,
which embodies a free way of life—avivere libero. A state is free, if and only if, it
is self-governing, that is not under the control of others than the citizens. Thus,
liberty can only be fully assured ‘within a self-governing form of republican com-
munity’ (see Skinner in Rorty et al. (eds.) 1991: 206–7). For Pettit, particularly,
this republican notion of liberty is distinct from both negative and positive liberty.
It is not about freedom from interference. It is rather focused on the notion of
non-domination—although it might also be seen as a significant modification of
negative liberty, namely, ‘resilient negative liberty’. However, Pettit insists that there
is a marked difference between freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-
domination. Freedom as non-domination invokes the notion, not just of interference,
but ofarbitraryinterference. An arbitrary act is chosen or not chosen at the agent’s
pleasure. It is also interference with others, which is chosen or rejected without refer-
ence to the interests, or the opinions, of those affected. Freedom or liberty therefore
implies institutional and legal protections against arbitrary interference. Thus, it is
thenature, or qualitative appraisal, of the interference, which is crucial for repub-
licans such as Pettit and Skinner. Republican freedom is not opposed to law, but